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ABSTRACT
In accordance with the 1988 Army Aviation Modernization Plan, the Army entered
contractual agrcement to begin acquisition of 2,253 U11-60 utility helicopters to replace
approximately two-thirds of the 3,147 UtI-I aircraft destined for retirement. The plan
foresaw the newer aircraft assuning the majority of the utility mission with the residual
balance of UIl-I helicopters assuning a supplcmcntary role. Because of subsequcnt
budgetary considerations, the decision was reached to stop purchasing rcplacemcnt air-
craft after the close of Fiscal Year 91. By that tihe the Army's total procurement will
have reachcd 1,147 aircraft, considerably short of the established target. Army planners
now face the difficult task of reconliguring the utility fleet with available assets to satisfy
future service needs.
Although not immediately obvious, this new challenge has arisen at a fortuitous
moment. Recent political changes manilfest within the Warsaw Pact nations and the
Soviet Union have clearly vindicated our strategy of prcparing For war in Europe to
prevent its onset. "lhrcat analysis now suggests that the most likely use of US military
force resides in the low intensity conflict (LIC) theater. Recognizing that the UII-60
was designed to prosecute mechanized war, the question of its application to LIC rests
largely on speculation. Now, before irrevocable decisions are made to retire the majority
of tile UII-1 fleet, the Army must determine which of the two aircraft will better serve
our future needs. Another environment-technology mismatch reminiscent of the aborted
hostage rescue attempt would be inexcusable.
As a preliminary comparison a semi-Markov process was formulated to forecast
performance of both aircraft in desert, mountain and jungle environments during day
and night conditions. The model incorporated segments from five standard utility heli-
copter missions into a Markov chain and predicated eight dillIrent measures associated
with survivability avd mission accomplishment. The results were somewhat surprising.
All fIactors relating to survivability confirmed the UI1-60 the superior aircraft
throughout the entire range of scenarios. This conclusion is consistent with Ui 1-60 de-
sign specifications relating to crashworthincss and ballistic tolerance which were specif-
ically established to correct deficiencies noted in the UII-I during the Vietnam War.
I lowever, concerning mission accomplishment, tile UI 1-1 proved to be the better aircraft
across all environmental variations. Sinfilarly, when operational costs of' the two heli-
iii
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copters were conips'red, expenses associated with the Ull-60 were twice those of the
U"I-1.
The main impact of these findings concerns the fact that neither aircraft emerges the
clear winner. This analysis can be easily expanded to perforn a more thorough corn-
parison based upon measures selected by Army leadcrship. Armed with such results, the
Army can make informed decisions regarding the fluture composition of the utility fleet.
iv
REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. THlE INTRODUCTION ..................... 1
11. 11113I CATAL1.YST IS............................................3
Ill. THE CON'L-XI' .............................................. 10
IV. THE MISSION..............................................17
a. Aeroniedical Evacuation.................................. 19
b. Resupply...........................................20
c. Command and Control.................................2
d. Search and Rescue .................................... 22




VIII. A SUMNMARY OF FINDINGS ................................ 44
APPENDIX A. PRIOBABILITFYANI)'IIIE TR1ANSITIO1N MATR'1ICES . . .. 46
APPEND)IX B. STATE SPACE DESCRIPTION.........................70
APPENDIX C. AI'L COMPUTATIONAL PROGRAM................... 72
APPENI)IX13. M ETI ODOLOGY FOR MATRIX MAN IPU LATION....... 74
APPENDIX E. DATA RESULTS WITH U1l-l BIAS..................... 77
V
REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE
APIPENDIX F. D)ATA RESULTS WITH1 IJII-60 BIAS .......... 78
LIST OF REFLERLNCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 79
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LISTI . ................... 82
vi
REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE
L!ST OF TABLES
Table 1. FORECAST DAILY SUPPLY CONSUMP~lTION RATE IN POUND)S
PER MAN..............................................20
TFable 2. AIRCRAFT COMIPARISON........... ..................... 27
[able 3. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE CALCULAT IONS ............. 36
Table 4. PROBABI LITY O1F LAND)ING UNI)AiMAGEI-')])AMAGIEI)....... 36
TFable 5. PROBABILITY DAM\,AGE IS MODE:RAT1E',StVERE. ............ 36
Table 6. \,IEASURELS OF PERFORMIANCE f1 ANI) #2.................. 37
Table 7. ME01ASURES OF PERFORMANCE #3, #4 AND #5............... 38
Table 8. MJEASURES OF PERF-ORM\,ANCE1 #6, #7 AND) #8............... 39
Table 9. PROB3ABILITY OF LANDING UNDAMAGLED;DAMAGEI) (BIAS
liI-I)..................................................40
TFable 10. IIIRO1AI31LITIY I)AMIAGE ISNMODERATEX*'L,'SlEVE RE (BIAS ElI-I) . 40
Table I11. iMEASURE OF PER7'ORMANCE #1.......................... 41
Table 12. P~ROBABI LITY OF LANDING UNDAiMAGED)/DAMAGED (BIAS
Uli-60) ................................................. 41
Table 13. P~ROBABILITY DAMAGE IS MODERNIE/SEVERE (BIAS U11-60) . 41
Table 14. MvEASURE OF P~ERFORMANCE #1.......................... 42
Table 15. COSTPIARAMETERS.....................................42
Table 16. COST EFFECTIVENESS RATIOS............................43
Table 17. UlI-I TRAjNSITION PROBABILITY MATRIX (DAY DESERT) . .. 46
Table 18. UII-I TRANSITION TIME MATRIX (I)AY I)ESERT)........... 47
Table 19. UllI TRAN SITI ON P)ROBAB3L ITY M ATR IX (DAY J UNG LE) . .. 48
Table 20. U1I-I TRANSITION TIME M'VATRIX (I)AY JUNGLE)........... 49
Table 21. UlI-I TR-ANSITION PROBABILITY MATRIX (I)AY MOUNTAIN) 50
Table 22. UII-l TRANSITION TIME MATRIX (1)AY MOUNTAIN)........ 51
Table 23. Eli-I TRANSITION P~ROBABILITY MAT1RIX (NIGhT D)ESERT) . 52
Table 24. UlI-I TFRANSITIONTIME MATRIX (N16GI'T'DESERT)......... 53
Table 25. U1- II-l TRANSIT'ION PROBABIIlY M 'NATIRIX (NIGI IT JUNGLE-) . 54
Table 26. UlI-I T'RANSITION TIME01 MvATIRIX (NIGhT JUNGLE)......... 55
Table 27. UJII TRANSITION PROBAIIILIIY MATRIX (NIGIIT MOUN-
TAIN)....................................... I.......... 56
Vii
REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE
Table 28. UIl-I TRANSITION TIME MA'RIX (NIGII' MOUNTAIN) ..... 57
Table 29. UHl-60TRANSITION PROBABILITY MATRIX (I)AY DESERT) ... 58
Table 30. U11-60 TRANSITION TIME MATRIX (DAY I)ISERT) .......... 59
Table 31. UII-60TRANSITION PROBABILITY MATRIX (DAY JUNGLE) .. 60J
Table 32. U11-60 TRANSITION TIME MAI RIX (l)AY .IUNGLE) .......... 61
Table 33. il-60 TRANSITION PROBABILITY MAIRIX (DAY MOUNTAIN) 62
Table 34. UII-60 TRANSITION TIME MATRIX (DAY MOUNTAIN) ....... 63
Table 35. UII-60 TR, kNSITION I[>OBABILITY MATRIX (NIGIlT DESERT) . 64
Table 36. UIlI-60 TlRANSITION TIME MATRIX (NIGI II)DESERT ) ........ 65
Table 37. LII-60TIRANSIIlON PROBABILIIY MATRIX (NIGIlIT JUJNGLI-) 66
Table 38. Ul1-60 TRAMNSITION TIM E MATRIX (NIGIIT JUNGLE) ........ 67
Table 39. UII-60TRANSITION PROBABILITY MATRIX (NIGIIT MOUN-
T A IN ) ... ... ... .. .. ... .. .. ... ... ... ... ... .. ... ... ... . . os
Table 40. UII-60 TRAL,\NSIION TIME MATRIX (NIGIIF MOUNTAIN) ..... 69
Table 41. EXAMPLE P MATRIX ................................... 74
Table 42. 1EXAMIlLl T MATRIX ................................... 74
Table 43. FIRST LINE FROM N MATRIX ............................ 76
Table 44. MEASURES OF FFECTIVENIESS #1 TIIROUGII #8 ........... 77
Table 45. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVEN:ESS #1 TIIROUGII #8 ........... 78
viii
REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE
1. THE INTRODUCTION
1"Vith 2000 years of example behind us we had no excuse, iwhen fighting for not fightng
well."
T.E. Lairrence
The US Army is charged with two fundamental and complenicntary tasks. First, it
must deter armed aggression directed against the nation or its vital interests. And sec-
ond, should deterrence (ail, it must quickly subdue the aggressor while containing the
scope of the conflict. To accomplish these objectives, the Army must assemble, train
and maintain a standing firce capable of engaging potential cnemics in any conceivable
part of" the world.
Because the government constrains the size and cost of'its armed services, the Army
cannot build an organization capable of1 de ating all possible adversaries. Limiting as-
sumptions must be made regarding the probable identity and capabilities of the threat.
Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union has been our primary cnemy. Alliances
have becn Formed and contingency plans prepared specifically to contain the influence
of a hostile Soviet Union. As clear evidence of US resolve, portions of six mechanized
divisions are deployed in the European Theater and, of its eighteen active component
divisions, ten are mechanized infhntry or armor, designed lbr high speed maneuver in
European terrain.
I lowever, recent events have prompted the Army to reevaluate probable threats.
The rapid rise of nationalism among Third World na'ions coupled with a less belligerent
Soviet Union suggest that future American military involvement is most likely in the
realm of low intensity conflict ([IC). Though the Army has experience in this environ-
ment, its equipment inventory remains essentially designed Fbr mechanized war. Even
light infantry divisions, touted as American specialists in LIC, were conceptually de-
signed to rapidly reinforce mechanized forces in the [European and Far Eastern Theaters.
In light of recent developments the logical question to ask is 'Can equipment designed
for mechanized war be readily adapted to LIC?'
Accordingly, the purpose of* this thesis is to evaluate the performance of current
military equipment in LIC missions. Two helicopters will be compared, the aging UII-I
REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENS-
Iroquois, a relatively simple gencral purpose transport, arid its planned replacenent, the
UI-60 Black Ilawk, a more technically sophisticated aircraft. This comparison will
match the performance and costs of each aircraft undcr a variety of conditions and will
hopefully offer insight regarding the use of technically complex equipment in the TIC
environment.
"'he paper begins by recounting the events which prompted a review of our military
posture. It exaniines various factors basic to the comparison by describing the LIC en-
vironment, primary missions assigned to utility helicopters and technical aspects of the
two aircraft. Next, the paper introduces the seini-Markov process as a versatile, analytic
tool, defends its selcction to predict aircraft performance and uses elements of the pre-
ceding sections to Formulate a feasible state space. Finally, using measures of e(fThctive-
ness generated by the stochastic analysis, the !,aper concludes with a detailed analysis
of the perolrmance and cost projections fbr each modeled aircraft.
2
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I1. TIlE CATALYSTS
"Nothing endures but chazge."
lleradlitus 540-480 B.C.
That ours is a world of change is not a new idea; change is a theme which pervades
the very fabric of the industrialized world. One has only to recall clamoring groups of'
peoplc, impatient for a curc for Acquired Immune )eliciency Syndrome to realize that
in our society pcople expect change. What is surprising, however, is the enormity of'
change in our present age. In 1992 twelve European nations will enter an economic
union which will parallel in many ways the formation of a new nation-state. In stril-
torn Nicaragua, Communist leader, Daniel Ortega, was pcaceFlully replaced by Violeta
Chamorro as president in a iee election. And Soviet leaders and rcpresentatives of
aggrieved constituents have entered discussions which could conceivably lead to peaceful
secession of republics fiom the USSR. These and other developments have profoundly
altered the economic and security environments facing the US, prompting its Armed
Forces to reassess the nation's potential advisories as well as its ability to prosecute
strategic objectives.
Contemporary US defense strategy has habitually cmph'tsized two extreme military
contingencies. The first involves an unpro,oked conventional assault launched by
mmInbers of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) against Western Eurpe
while the second encompasses a preemptive nuclear attack by the Soviets against US
strategic forces throughout the world. Though many American politicians draw clear
distinctions between the two possible scenaiio€: most North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) officials consider the two corporately. The Warsaw Pact Forces enjoy a
clear numerical advantage in men and materiel over their NATO counterparts, and
should conventional war ignite between thc two alliances, many Europeans believe that
without nuclear intervention the NATO Forces would be rapidly overrun before sullicient
reinforcements could arrive from North America. Ultimately, they rely upon NAIOs
nuclear arsenal and the threat of its use against the Soviet homeland to deter conven-
tional as well as nuclear aggression (Ref. 1: p. 331.
3
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Ironically, past experience suggests that tile Soviets have no inclination to instigate
a direct confrontation with the US. Since the construction of the Berlin Wall and re-
solution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union has been content to achieve in-
cremental advances throughout the world by use of aid and occasional military force.
Following this practice, the Soviets have achieved notable gains among Third World
nations, much to America's chagrin. It ) uhl appcar that a national defiense strategy
emphasizing punitive use of nuclear weapons in both a conventional and nuclear context
is ine[fiectual in circumstances where nationm objectives arc limited and military action
can only be applied with considerable political restraint lRef. 1: pp. 33-4j.
Such a del inse strategy grows even more cumbersome in light of recent international
political changes. Durinig the 1950s and 1960s US containment of Soviet global influ-
ence was grounded upon the 'donino theory' which maintained that the fall of a key
democratic govcrnment to Communists would precipitate subsequent Communist take-
overs of neighboring states. Belief in this assertion prompted US military intervention
in Vietnam. Surprisingly, 1989 and 1990 have witnessed another donino clliect as several
Conununist regimes have sequentially toppled in the wake of a massive democratic,
nationalistic trend [Ref. 2: p. 18J. Most notable are the changes which have assailcd
members of the Warsaw Pact. Though an observer might be hard pressed to identify' a
specific incident which sparked the chain of events that have permanently altered the
political complexion of Eastern Europe, two declarations by President Gorbachev had
substantial elf'ect.
Under Leonid i. Brezhnev, the Soviet Union reserved (ie right to intervene militarily
to secure Marxist governments in jeopardy. '[his policy, termed the 'liezlincv Doctrine',
was used to justify the 1968 Soviet invasion ol'Czechoslovakia. In March 1989 amid a
constitutional reform movement in I lungary, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev as-
sured I lungarian Party leader Karloy Grosz that the Soviet Union would not interfere,
elliectively renouncing the Brezhnev Doctrine IRef. 3: pp. 243-4J. In December of the
previous year, Gorbachev had announced belore the United Nations General Assct bly
that the Soviet Union would unilaterally withdraw 50,000 men from the German Dem-
ocratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and ,tungary by the end of 1990 [Ref. 4: p. 101. On
25 April 1989 formal withdrawal, of Soviet forces from I lungary actually began IRef. 3:
p. 332).
Buoyed by the assurance that internal politics would not be stilled by Soviet re-
pression, Eastern iE.urope began to cast off its mantle of Conununisni. In I lungary the
government's approval to form independent political parties inaugurated the mcans to
4
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challenge the ruling Socialist Worker's Party fir governmental control. lhough other
Soviet-bloc nations previously boasted multiparty systems, their rival parties were inev-
itably Communist-contreled [Ref. 3" p. 111. In conjunction with a May 1989 decision
to relax travel restrictions, I lIungary began dismantling the barbed wire fence which
marked its border with neutral Austria [Ref. 3: p. 3431. Later in October at the 33rd
anniversary of the 1956 popular uprising, acting President Matyas Szuros declared
IIungary a free republic, pledging that "'The I Iungarian republic is going to be an inde-
pendent, democratic and legal state in which the values of bourgeois democracy and
democratic socialism are expressed equally, ." IRel. 3: p. 8071.
'This democratic fervor was certainly not limited to 1 lungary. Within the short span
of two years, Communist regimes in Poland and Czechoslovakia were peacefully re-
moved through national election and replaced by multiparty systems. Bulgaria, re-
maining under Conununist leadership, also passed legislation authorizing multiparty
elections IRef. 5: p. 248. Amid a bitter civil uprising in Rumania, Conununist Party
leader Nicolae Ceausescu and his wifi were overthrown and executed in l)ccember of'
1989. An interim government assumed provisional control pronising sweeping demo-
cratic reform which has yet to be realized IRef. 3: p. 957).
Equally dramatic are developments in the German Democratic Republic. In an
address in the Federal Republic of Germany on 31 May 1989, President Bush declared
that "... Europe would only become 'whole and fiee' if'the Berlin wall were torn down
.Ref. 3: p. 394j ; in November of that same year it occurred. Since then exclusive
parliamentary control by Communists has been broken, multiparty elections have oc-
curred and progress towarrd the country's economic and political union with the Federal
Republic of Germany proceeds apace.
Nor is the Soviet Union immune from the effects of nationalism. Encouraged by the
political turmoil of Eastern Europe, many of the Soviet republics have openly demon-
strated their desire to secede from the parent union. By the end of May 1990, all three
ol'the Baltic Republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia had declared independence from
the Soviet Union. To emphasize its declaration, Estonia had changed its national title,
adopted its own flag [Ref. 5: pp. 345-61 and abolished the military draft [Ref. 5: p. 2751.
Ethnic violence and sccessional aspirations have also risen in the Kirgizia, Georgia and
Azerbaijan Republics. And a most revealing picture was sketched by the results of the
Soviet parliamentary elections held last March. Though clearly not pluralistic in an
American sense, the election voiced dissatisfa.ction with current practices as candidates
representing anti-party and anti-KGB platflorms won seats IRef. 6: p. 201.
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Undoubtedly, profound change has occurred in the Soviet Union. Though the
USSR remains America's most serious nilitary threat, President Gorbachev's actions
tend to nitigate his nation's belligerent posture. The Soviet nilitary withdrawal firom
Afghanistan and proposed unilateral force reductions are consistent with the Gencral
Secretary's announced intentions to shift national production to the consumer goods
sector. Also, the degree of political self-deternination recently afforded Eastern
European nations implies that Soviet nilitary intervention in foreign governments, as
occurred in I lungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), is no longer deemed viable.
This Soviet military retrenchment is also reflected in their enthusiasm to enter nu-
clear and conventional arms control negotiations. With the ratification of' the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the US has enhanced its security by securing
three lasting objectives. First, all US and Soviet ground-launched ballistic and cruise
missiles with functional ranges within 500 and 5,500 kilometers will be completely elim-
inated. Second, a precedent was established regarding asynumetrical reductions to a level
of mutual equality. And finally, verification procedures which virtually preclude inten-
tional treaty violations have been formally commissioned Ic. 7: pp. 1-131.
An unfinished legacy from the Reagan administration, the Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks (START) Treaty may be concluded imminently. Such an agreement would eflect
actual reduction of nuclear arms by restricting nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles.
Even as the technical enumeration and verifications details governing the initial agree-
ment are resolved, proposals for a subsequent S'ART treaty are being formulated
[Ref. 8: pp. 1-21.
Within the broader scope of the European community of nations, the 1986
Stockholm Document of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures
and Disarmament in Europe has greatly contributed to maintenance of harmony be-
tween the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The document prescribes an-
nouncement of major military exercises and authorizes observers to monitor and inspect
military exercises. This agreement was a precursor to the Conventional Armed Forccs
in Europe (CFE) iicgotiations initiated in March 1989 [Ref. 7: pp. 1-131.
The CFE talks represent an attempt by NATO and the Warsaw Pact to asymmet-
rically reduce conventional armament to equal levels within Europe. The agreement
addresses several weapon system categories to include tanks, armored personnel carriers,
artillery, helicopters and combat aircraft, assigning compulsory linits as well as verili-
cation procedures [Retf. 7: pp. 1-13]. Though [residents Bush and Gorbachev had an-
ticipated a finalized agreement prior to the close of 1990, technical stipulations
6
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concerning the different types of weaponry and the need For mutually satisfactory ver-
ification procedures may delay the treaty's conclusion beyond tile new year.
Reduction and an eventual ban of cheniical weapons is also being pursued on a bi-
lateral basis with the USSR and internationally at the Confbrence on Disarmament in
Geneva. Though progress toward a worldwide ban on chenical weapons possession is
plodding, an agreement with the Soviets to destroy portions of both nation's stockpiles
may be imminent [Ref. 9: pp. 1-21.
Together, arms control advancement and tile changing political clime in lastern
E-urope have vastly altered the security environment facing the US. Accordingly, the
US has seriously begun to reexanine its national priorities, making adjustments as ap-
propriate. Driven by a large aging segment of the population, more resources are being
channelled to social programs. And the easing of international tension has enabled
Congress to focus attention upon reducing the national debt. Congressional resolve re-
garding deficit reduction is evident by its enactment of the Balanced Budget and lE'mcr-
gency Deficit Control Act of 1985, better known as 'Granun-Rudman-I lollings'.
This legislation constituted a procedural rule by which deficit reduction would occur
autonmatically if appropriate restraint was not otherwise exercised in the annual budget-
ary process. The bill specified compulsory budget reductions from 1986 through 1990
leading to a balanced budget in 1991. In the event a budget proposal exceeded the
specified ceiling, the President was obliged to eflect mandatory reductions applied
equally between defense and domestic programs to bring the budget into compliance
with the statutory ceiling. Further, nearly two-thirds of the domestic programs were
exempted firom automatic presidential reduction measures, placing a proportionally
greater onus of responsibility for deficit reduction upon the Department of Defense
(l)oD) [Rer. 10: pp. 96-71.
From the Army's perspective the thrust of this measure translates into a substan-
tially reduced organization. Consequently, beginning with the Fiscal Year (FY) 91
budget proposal, the Army plans to condense and reshape its force structure by means
of selective reduction and reorganization to a revised design stabilizing in 1995. The
implementation of this plan has already begun [Ref. 7: pp. V-31.
In May 1988 Defense Secretary Carlucci formed a commission to examine all Dol)D
bases within the US and reconnend closures and realignments which would generate
base operations savings and elininate excess property. 'The group recommended that
operation of 91 bases be curtailed or closed. The commission's findings were endorsed
7
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by Secretary Carlucci, sent to Congress to bc either approved or rejected in their entirety
and subsequently became public law [Ref. 3: p. 51.
In consonance with reduced funding levels, equipment modernization programs
have been stringently adjusted. Funding for the Army I Iclicoptcr Improvement Program
and the Improved Recovery Vehicle was completely withdrawn. Annual procurcment
of' Mobile Subscriber Equipment and the Al1-64 Apache will be reduced with terni-
nation reschedulcd to FY 91. Ongoing procurement of several other systems, to include
the Ul 1-60A Black I lawk, has also been reduced IRcf. 11: p, addendum].
For FY 91 the Army must reduce its total active component troop strength to
727,000. In order to comply, Secretary of the Army Stone has proposed several adjust-
ments. Initially Secretary Stone wishes to dcactivate the 2d Armored l)ivision at Fort
I lood, Texas and reduce the 9th Infantry )ivision stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington
to a motorized brigade. Coincidentally, he proposes transfbrring the 7th Infantry Divi-
sion to Fort Lewis, closing Fort Ord, California and moving a mechanized division from
the Federal Republic of Germany to Fort I lood. Other planned personnel reductions
involve an armored brigade at Fort Knox, Kentucky and an artillery battalion at Fort
Stewart, Georgia [Ref. 7: pp. V-3-41.
Earlier this year Defense Secretary Cheney proposed closing more than 80 military
bases in addition to those previously approved by Congress. In conjunction with his
most recent tour of ilitary bases in South Korea, the Philippines and Japan, he dis-
cussed with various allied government officials, withdrawal of American servicemen to-
taling 12,000 over the next two years [Ref. 5: p. 1371. When asked earlier concerning
his long range plans, Secretary Cheney commented that subsequent Army reductions
inight amount to 135,000 troops [Ref. 5: p. 681. Secretary Stone in a later interview
indicated that the Army's active component strength reduction could be as high as
200,000 by 1995 [Ref. 11: p. 1].
The cumulative impact of reduced funding, arms control and the evolving security
environment is generating profound change within the Army. To remain effective, the
iorce must adapt to present constraints and security risks. As tile potential for military
involvement in defense of NATO decreases, threats associated with underdeveloped na-
tions draw greater attention. If, as a result of budgetary constraints and CFE negoti-
ations, the forward basing of US forces is reduced, Army leadership may choose to
modify the service's organization and equipment inventory to better address low inten-
sity conflict (LIC) threats. With the bulk of the nation's equipment tailored to mech-
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anizcd wvar, such a shift in emlphasis would likely prompt all evaluation of equipment
suitability relative to the LIC environment.
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111. TIlE CONTEXT
"The Achilles heel of the capitalist economy lies in the colonies... sei'er the raw materials
flow friom the colonies and you cut the spinal cord of the empire."
V.L Lenin
Although the Soviet Union's conventional and nuclear military forces remain the
most tangible threat to US security, the probability of deliberate armed aggression be-
tween the two superpowers is small. Furthei.nore, contingent upon Chairman
Gorbachev's announced unilateral withdrawal of Soviet forces from certain Eastern
European nations, the chance of accidental confrontation is likewise reduced. The resi-
dual challenge to America's security lies in a variety of forms of organized violence col-
lectively described as low intensity conflict (LIC).
Developed in the 1970s, the term, LIC, has drawn considerable criticism since its
initial use. Many practitioners of war regard l.IC as an unfortunate misnomer, arguing
that it unduly mollifies the intensity of the violence which characterizes such conflicts.
Indeed, often strife between contending political factions translates rapidly into fierce
struggles for national survival. However, American responses to LIC imperatives have
historically required neither national mobilization nor vast military resource expenditure,
and compared to the national effort needed to sustain an actual conventional war, LIC
demands are relatively small, hence the terminology [ief. 12: p. 11.
LIC was created to denote a range of "politico-military activities" short of declared
conventional war. Primarily associated with insurgency and terrorism and activities de-
signed to suppress them, LIC is used by some authorities to encompass such conven-
tional nilitary engagements as the 1986 reprisal raid flown against Libya. Still others
use the term to describe certain nonviolent military operations such as peacekeeping
missions and security assistance programs. Despite the variety of opinions regarding
definitive boundaries, LIC circumscribes an extremely diverse collection of
political military activities considered less extensive than conventional war. Trying to
concisely characterize so diverse an array of operations which includes the terrorist truck
bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut and the American invasion of Grenada,
10
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would invariably prove misleading, but certain attributes common to all forms of LIC
diferentiate it from conventional war [Rcf. 12: p. 2].
First, low intensity conflicts cannot be resolved by the exclusive application of mili-
tary maneuver and conccntration of fires. They normally emphasize small unit, decen-
tralized operations employing unconventional tactics and fluid, dismounted formations
consistent with the terrain. Consequently, success cannot be achieved in short order;
participants must invest considerable time to elliect favorable results [Ref. 12: p. 31.
Second, low intensity conflict rarely involves the traditional confrontation of
massed, uniformed Forces on a recognized battlefield. The distinction between
combatant and civilian is obscured, confounding enemy identilication as well as estab-
lished laws governing the conduct of war. Further, the traditional boundaries separating
secure rear areas and front lines do not exist. Relying upon his ability to assimilate with
the indigenous population, an insurgent soldier can attack virtually any lucrative target.
Like the insurgent, most successful counterguerrilla operations involve platoon or squad
sized units moving about with exposed flanks and an unsecured rear. Because groups
operate relatively independently, attachment of' engineer, logistic and fire support is
necessary at small unit level to provide inherent self'suflicieiicy [Ref. 12: pp. 3-41.
Third, the central objective of low intensity conflict is to gain the support of the host
population. Whether by persuasion or through duress, this pivotal concern must doni-
nate Formulation of all tactical plans. Past measures such as 'body counts' or captured
weapons are irrelevant in the LIC environment; the degree of success achieved must be
gauged by the loyalty of the civilian people and coincident alienation of the antagonist
[Ref. 12: p. 41.
Fourth, each conflict is unique to its terrain, its people and its political circuni-
stances and must therefore be examined at length and entered with tactics and strategy
adapted to the specific circumstances involved [lef. 12: p. 4].
Finally, low intensity conflict more than any other military action emphasizes poli-
tical considerations. Though military intervention is by definition an exercise of political
authority, probably in no other use of military force are political constraints so confin-
ing. In retrospect many crises favorably concluded will reveal that conflict resolution
emerged less from military influence than Crom medical, police and econonic support
[Ref 12: p. 41.
Though the term, low intensity conflict, is relatively new, the struggle it represents
is not. Despite its poor performance in Vietnam, the US has successfully contended in
this style of war since its revolutionary origin. During the nineteenth century, as pioneer
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settlement expandcd west, the Army fought campaigns against such elusive foe as the
Sioux Indians led by Crazy Horse. In 1900, the Army was called to Southeast Asia to
suppress the Philippine insurrection led by l'milio Aguinaldo. Again in 1927, the US
sought to restore order to strifc-torn Nicaragua by dispatching US Marines to quell a
civil uprising led by Augusto Sandino [Rcf. 12: p. 11.
In the aftermath of World War 1I and the Korean War much of the LIC experience
gained in earlier campaigns was lost as America reduced her armed forces. In 1905, as
major deployments of American forces initially entered Vietnam, the US was again
embroiled in a counterinsurgency. As time wore on and American casualties mounted,
the public eventually realized that the war was being prosecuted ineptly. So vehement
became the criticism of America's participation in the war that military aid to developing
nations was stringently curtailed, and much of the US nilitary infrastructure designed
to support LIC operations was elininated. The legacy of disappointment from Vietnam
severely constrained US nilitary use through the end of the decade of the 1970s
[Relf 12: p. 8].
Three trends in global politics finally arrested the decline of US military capabilities
in the IIC realm.
" The Soviet Union initiated an aggressive program of intervention in conflicts
among developing Third World nations. Many observers directly attributed Soviet
adventurism in Mozambique, Ethiopia and Angola to American resistance to Third
World involvement.
" International terrorism reached the forefront of tnedia attention with spectacular
plane hijackings, kidnappings and car bombings reniniscent of Japanese kamikaze
pilots. American citizens abroad were lilling victim to terrorist atrocities, and the
1kderal government fielt powerless to prevent or retaliate against such acts.
" In response to seizure of American nationals abroad, the armed Forces demon-
strated incompetence in effecting their release. The disastrous response to the sei-
zure of the SS Mayaguez crew by pirates and the aborted rescue of' US embassy
hostages in Tehran stood in stark contrast to the internationally applauded suc-
cesses of the West Germans and Israelis in similar situations [Rc. 12: pp. 8-91.
With the election of a Republican administration under Ronald Reagan in 1980, the
national bias against involvement in Third World politics was reversed. Economic aid
to Central American governments and Forces aligned against Marxist rule resumed in
earnest. From 1980 to 1988, the US provided over $6.3 billion in military and econonic
aid to El Salvador, I londuras, Costa Rica and Guatemala. Concurrently, support for
the Contra guerrillas in their war against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was steadily
supplied. Assistance was not limiited to Central America. The US sent substantial aid
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to tile Philippine govcrnment to strengthen its light against two guerrilla forces.
Weapons and supplies were sent to the mujahideen to support the expulsion of Soviet
troops who had invaded their homeland in 1979, and support was channelled to
guerrillas fighting Cuban fbrces in Angola. Also, Funding for the Department of Dcfense
enjoyed a dramatic increase. The Special Operations community was specifically tar-
geted for expansion while, in addition, the Army formed Four Light Infantry Divisions
IRef. 12: p. 111.
The Light Inflntry Division was originally conceived as a strike force capable of
sustaining limited operations in a variety of contingencies. To enhance its strategic
mobility, the division's equipment was stringently limited to what an inflantryman could
carry on his back supplemcnted by a small assortment of wheeled vehicles to carry
heavier weapons. The division's primary focus was directed to the low intensity realm
of conlict in regions lacking a 'developed support infrastructure' [Ref. 13: p. 11 so lack
of tactical mobility would not impede its ability to engage an opponent.
Surprisingly, its original architects claimed that the light division's lack of heavy
equipment wo'ild not preclude its deployment to either L'urope or the Far East in a re-
inforcing role of forward-deployed US ground forces. Proponents of the light infantry
concept explained that given terrain which restricted traflicability of mechanized forces,
the light units could, using cover. stealth and initiative, engage and destroy a motorized
enemy. Nevertheless, the Army's primary capability for LIC resides within the Light
Infantry Divisions [Ref. 13: pp. 1-21.
And what of the future? For a nation blessed with geographic isolation, abundant
national resources and a large consumer market, recent world events should encourage
the US to become more circumspect of international involvement and concentrate on
domestic economic revitalization. With the 'Cold War' in Europe rapidly approaching
political arnistice, arms reduction talks proceeding apace and democratic patterns de-
veloping in former Communist strongholds, what remains to threaten US security? Ex-
perts respond in part by sighting evolving trends in LIC.
The modern representation of LIC stems primarily from three historic catalysts;
modernization, Soviet adventurism and decolonization. "Ihough mode: nization persists
throughout the devcloping regics of the world, Soviet interest in the Third World has
begun to wane. Similarly, contingent upon Namilbia's independence, decolonization will
have been virtually completed, and yet, the present-day level of regional world violence
registers the spread of' LIC despite reduction of' its initial root causes. Three reasons
explain the continued growth of this phenomenon IRef. 14: p. 101.
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First, enduring poverty propagates widespread discontent. In distressed areas of the
world where sickness persists, dissatisfaction grows acute. Modernization which has
spawned rapid urbanization leaves large concentrations of people unemployed,
fomenting crime and civil unrest. The proliferation of modcrn conmmunication and
transportation accentuates the discrepancy between 'haves' and 'have nots' and fosters
anger which is ultimately directed at the existing government IRef. 14: p. 111.
Second, regardless of the future of Soviet intervention in Third World countries,
sponsors of organized violence will remain. Many states today possess not only the
motivation but the means to organize large scale rebellion. With exportation of the
Soviet armament industry to aligned governments and the surplus of funds accruing
from petroleum and narcotics trade, states such as Syria, Libya, Iran and South Alrica
are willing patrons of organized regional unrest Iref. 14: p. I I].
And third, the constraints which originally held the level of violence below the con-
ventional war threshold remain in place. From the insurgelts' perspective, resource
availability provides the major barrier to continued escalation, though the motivation
to expand the cotillict is ever present. Conversely, from the sponsor's standpoint, re-
luctance to risk superpower confrontation bridles their willingness to manipulate vi-
olence [Ref. 14: p. 111.
Where might low intensity conflict arise? The recent spate of current events suggests
a variety of possible sites. With the retrenchment of the Soviet Union friom Eastern
Europe and the nationalistic fervor of republics within that country, demands for na-
tional sovereignty may soon echo those voiced by Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The
prelude to possible collapse of the Soviet empire would certainly provide fertile ground
for LIC. And regardless of their future, the Soviets will continue to incite insurgency
outside their borders to further their national interests [R1ef. 14: p. 121.
As Europe integrates its markets and industrialization continues elsewhere, compe-
tition for raw resources will intensify. Third Woild countries rich in raw materials may
form cartels simnilar to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in order to
exert collective econoic pressure on industrialized nations who, in turn, may resort to
LIC if alternative sources of production are not available [Ref. 14: p. 121.
Finally, tribal, ethnic, religious and racial striie will continue to loster unrest in re-
gional disputes for the inmcdiate future [Rel.. 14: p. 121. As new nations emerge and
mature, internal dissent will occasionally be vented by organized violence. This partic-
ular source of unrest may assume a new character from that of the past. Previously,
rural-bascd movements characterized by masses of people poorly armed and organized,
14
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depended upon mass support before being afforded serious government attention. But
advancements in conununication, transportation and weapons have considerably low-
ered the necessary threshold to endanger an incumbent administration. Today, even
small, well-organized groups can create suflicient destruction to unseat tenuous govern-
lllentS.
This more recent development of insurgent capability deserves further attention.
The historic guerrilla soldier travelled on foot, wore the clothes of a peasant and dc-
pende'l almost exclusively upon small arms. Some current insurgencies, notably thc
Sendero Luininoso in Peru and the New People's Army in the Philippines follow this
pattern. lowever, examination of the Aflghan mujahidecn, the Farabundo Marti Na-
tional Liberation Front in El Salvador and the Contras in Nicaragua confirms that so-
phisticated weapons are not the exclusive dominion of the government forces [Ref. 15:
p. 441.
In the next decade, insurgent forces will yield greater firepower than their predeces-
sors. Modern automatic weapons exhibit increased rates of lire while their size and
weight have been substantially reduced making them much easier to carry and conceal.
The Ni 16 and AK47 automatic rifles are now conunonplace in many guerrilla move-
ments, and evidence of the Uzi machinegun and Ingrain machine pistol has been re-
ported during encounters in Central America. The insurgent arsenals have expanded to
include such sophisticated weaponry as grenades, rockets and missiles. Where before
massed small arms were used to attack aircraft, infrared missiles are now found to be
more devastating. Guerrilla use of light anti-arnor weapons also puts most government
wheeled and armored transport at risk as well I Ref. 15: pp. 44-6].
Improvements have also been made in conumunication equipment. Thanks to the
electronics revolution, transceivers which are reliable, rugged and compact, can be pur-
chased at reasonable cost. Reliance upon the foot soldier to comnunicate instructions
is now obsolete. Attacks can be concentrated more rapidly and with greater complexity
than previously. Further, the security of the guerrilla is enhanced as scouts monitor
enemy progress [Ref 15: p. 461.
Additionally, as a result of. refinement of recreational and sporting clothes and
equipment, the austere lifestyle of the insurgent fighter has noticeably improved.
Lightweight jungle clothes, boots and water repellent camping gear are readily available
to most indigenous forces. Dehydrated food and primary medical supplies also enhance
the soldiers hygiene and raise his dependability [Ref. 15: p. 461.
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These advancements collectively represcnt a vast Force multiplier with which tile
government force must contend. At times the inlsurgent may gain combat parity with
his opponent and be less inclined to avoid a direct confirontation. Consequently, care
must be exercised by the counterinsurgent as he assumes his nission. "The advances in
technology will serve his advantage to a point. I lowever, the Soviet Union's recent ex-
perience in Afghanistan stands as a clear reminder that adapting inappropriate technol-
ogy to this war can render disappointing results lRef. 15: p. 461.
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IV. TIlE MISSION
"It is not so much the moide oftbrmation as the proper combined use of the difierent arms
which will insure victor,."
Jonini, 1838
Despite the penchant of many nations to assess military might through force-level
comparisons, the simple aggregation of weapon systems is not an accurate measure of
combat power. Ordinarily, a force's cfl'ectivencess is magnilied when its components are
combincd in complementary roles. By integratiing different weapons and organizations
into a colicsive whole, limitations of one element can be compensated for by strengths
of others. Then, as an enemy attempts to evade the elfcts of one weapon systcn, he
becomes exposed to these ofanother [Ref. 16: p. 251.
This structuring technique, known at small unit level as formning combined arms
teams and in higher echelons as task force organization, is not achieved by merely
amassing a variety of weapons and soldiers. The group must be organizationally unified.
As with a capable Football team, each member must properly execute assignments coin-
cidcnt with those of his teammates in order for the team to advance. In ellhct, this de-
sign process represents a continuous cycle. When a weapon is introduced into the arms
inventory, attempts to integrate it within the force, and thereby, gain advantage over
potential encmies, begin. Unfortunately, the cycle often fialtcrs. Considerable trial ad
error generally attend attempts to evaluate new combat capabilities and subsequently
merge them into a cohesive fighting fabric. Furthermore, commanders comfortable with
capabilities proven in the past, mechanically apply dated techniques to succeeding
struggles, ignoring the innovation and adaptation demanded ty the present conflict.
listory is sufficiently littered with unsuccessul military trials as a cursory review con-
firms.
With the perennial advance of technology, the destructive potential of combata~its
has steadily risen. Spears and clubs gave way to pistols, rifles and cannon. Mules and
horses were replaced by trucks and tanks, ditches and barricades by minefields and
chemical contaminants, each substitution more lethal than its predecessor and each
17
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fraught with mnishap in early attempts at assinilation. Military adaptation of aviation
serves to illustrate this process.
Initially an outgiowth of the postal service, the airplane eventually assumed a broad
role in combat as missions were matched to its expanding range of capabilities. One is
readily reminded of the airplane's contribution to Allied victories in World Wars I and
I I with pictures of aerial dog lights, bombing formations and strafing runs. 1 lowever,
as with other technical innovations, the airplane's success was not unqualified, especially
in the low intensity conflict realm.
Major limitations arose from the fact that airplanes were tethered to a system of
long, flat runways. Tcchnical enhancements increasing the speed and maneuverability
of aircraft also incicased the requirement Fbr runway length and smoothness. Often, in
underdeveloped nations whcre insurgency flourishcd, such facilities were unavailable and
if constructed, provided lucrative targets for guerrilla soldiers. Also, the dependence of
airplanes upon launch and recovery airfields has often frustrated their support of ground
forces. Because of range restrictions, small aircraft had insufficient time to deliver ef-
flictive ordnance upon assigned targets. Ironically, when long range heavy or medium
bombers were summoned for support, the indiscriminate destruction associated with
collateral damage estranged the indigenous population from the host government's civil
efforts lRef. 17: p. 271.
Despite dilliculties associated with the airplane's adaptation to counterinsurgency,
the most rcmarkable combat development of' recent note in LIC occurred in aviation
with the introduction of the helicopter. The unique capabilities of rotary-winged aircraft
were well matched to the austere geographic extremes commonly associated with un-
conventional warfare. Areas far removed from fixed-base runways could now anticipate
aerial support on a sustained basis. As early as the 1950s the British experience in
Malaya demonstrated the helicopter's ability to rapidly deliver, supply and evacuate
troops in the field. One British oflicer noted that "Without the very small force of heli-
copters we had in Malaya four times as many ground forces A,)uld have been required."
[Ref. 17: p. 291. In Kenya and Cyprus rotary-winged aircraft were employed ellectivcly
in psychological operations to broadcast government-sponsored propaganda. The
practice of dropping leaflets usually presumes that the enemy soldier is literate, an often
mistaken assumption. I lowever, helicopters equipped with loudspeakers, flying slowly
above the jungle floor, announcing the goveinment's promises of fair treatment, repeat-
cd!y drew large numbers of defectors from the insurgent's ranks [Ref. 17: p. 29J. Even
more significant was the helicopter's role as an airborne icconnaissance platform. The
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aircraft proved adept at locating and monitoring enciny troop movements and subse-
quently directing their cngagcment by friendly forces.
Notwithstanding their demonstrated value to counterinsurgent forces, helicopters
have inherent linitationls which the astute military planner will acknowledge. A review
of live tcets relating to past British experience in low intensity conflict provides valu-
able insight concerning helicopter employment.
While denying guerrillas sanctuaries and interdictiug their supply lines are essential
to an elfctive couIterinsurgent campaign, this mission is unsuited to the exclusive
use of acrial-delivcrcd firepower. This is nut mcant to imply that aerial attacks are
without effect. The American B52 air strikes in Vietnam aroused considerable Ifear
within the insuLgent ranks; nonetheless, the Ilo Chi Minh Trail remained viable
throughout the war's duration.
" Use of indiscriminate aerial firepower embitters the indigenous population while
lbstering sympathy for the insurgent cause.
" Slow airplanes and helicopters are valuable in this style of war due to their ability
to transport ground forces and perform reconnaissance.
* Insurgent warfare is protracted. Use of less technically sophisticated and expensive
aircraft poses a lower econonic risk to nations involved in LIC.
" The measure of technical sophistication needed in aircraft participating in l.IC de-
pends primarily upon the armament of the insurgent fbrces (Ref. 17: pp. 31-21.
In sum, as one English author notes "... the main role for the air force in
counterinsurgency was not so much striking against guerrilla bases as transporting and
supplying the ground forces." [Ref. 17: p. 291. In the US Army utility helicopters per-
form these tasks but are capable of several more. Which, then, of standard utility heli-
copter missions, will enhance the efl'ectivencss of the combined arms team in the LIC
environment? A panel of aviation experts selected five: aeroniedical evacuation, resup-
ply, coummand and control, search and rescue, and air assault.
it. Aeromedical Evacuation
Primary reliance for patient movement within the Armed Forces has been
placed upon aircraft by Department of Dcinse directive. The Army has accordingly
organized dedicated aviation units which combine a rapid and flexible utility helicopter
with a medically trained and provisioned crew to accomplish transport of casualties.
These 'air ambulances' are typically organized into detachments composed of six heli-
copters, which are tactically dispersed within brigade rear areas, or companies of
twenty-live helicopters retained by corps.
An appreciation of the acromcdical evacuation nmission is incomplete with-
out an understanding of the medical treatment system which it supports. Aid stations
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within battalion rear areas, medical companies in brigade and division rear areas and
field hospitals in the corps support area collectively provide care for the sick and
wounded within a land theater of operations. Patients are dispatched to appropriate
flacilities by surlace and aerial transport through an evaluative process termed 'medical
regulation'. Medical regulating oflicers assigned to divisions and corps maintain current
status of the capacity and capability of medical units within the theater of operations
and direct casualty evacuation accordingly.
Though air ambulance support can be specifically assigned in conjunction
with combat missions, requests are normally initiated on demand by the battalion aid
station. In the event a casualty's injuries cxcecd the medical capability of the aid station
or its ability to respond expeditiously, the aid station requests launch of a detachment
air ambulance from its parent medical company. The evacuation can be accomplished
fi'om either the point of injury or the aid station. After securing the injured parties, the
air ambulance crew describes the extent of injuries to the medical regulating olliccr ex-
ercising jurisdiction who determines the patient's destination. When injuries warrant
hospitalization, the aircraft is either directed to the appropriate facility or to the sup-
porting medical company where patient transfer is accomplished with aircraft dispatched
from corps.
b. Resupplv
The eflicient handling of supplies is of primary concern to the logistics of'
ficer. His functional objective is to keep the forces adequately provisioned without the
burdensome excess which could impede rapid movement. The sheer magnitude of this
mission is suggested by information contained in Table I which enumerates daily con-
sumption of supplies per man distinguished by supply class 1Ref. 18: p. 3-4].
Table 1. FORECAST DAILY SUPPLY CONSUMPTION RATE IN POUNDS
PER MAN
class class class class class class class class class class total
I la II IV V VI Vii VIi X X
6.7 3.26 47.8 8.5 31.29 3.2 4.27 0.35 1.52 0.0 106.89
These figures must be increased by a factor of 2.4 during the first thirty days of a con-
flict. To support even a Light Infantry i)ivision, these factors forecast a total daily
consumption of 1,068,900 pounds or 1,282 short tons. The responsibility for moving and
distributing this volume of freight is enormous, too large to be charged exclusively to a
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single organization. And in the domain of unconventional warfare, wherc 'secure rear
areas' are nonexistent, sell defense emerges as a vital component of the logistical
mission.
Surfce transport customarily satisfies cargo delivery requests, but fre-
quently ground lines of communication are severed by enemy interdiction, obstacles and
congestion. The carnage of war coupled with the exodus of refugees can quickly arrest
most road-bound traffic while the thin-skinned cargo trucks used to move supplies are
extremely susceptible to small arms ambush. Often, the pace of battle will simply out-
distance the capability ol'surface transport. In such cases aerial resupply ollbrs a con-
paratively less vuhlerable and more mobile alternative to surface transport. In forces
of division size and below, this function is discharged by the utility helicopter.
Consequently, the utility helicopter is often used to complement other
means of transportation. Thuuglh their most connon use entails moving personnel,
equipment and supplies beyond obstacles or to areas inaccessible to fixed-wing or sur-
face transpoi-t, utility helicopters frequently satisly logistic surge and time-sensitive de-
nwunds lRef. 19: p.' 4-2].
Air movements are administratively classified as either scheduled or un-
scheduled. Scheduled movements occur when air delivery oflers the most eflicient
transport option for regular, repetitive requirements [Ref. 19: p. 4-2]. Nonscheduled
missions arise from infirequent requirements such as unit reconstitution, personnel re-
placements and other unfbreseen contingencies.
The two most conmnon methods of cargo movement by utility aircraft are
internal and external load operations; although under extreme conditions, supplies can
be dropped after being rigged with energy-dissipating material or by parachute. If
weight and volume perinit, cargo is secured within the helicopter to avoid interfering
with flight aerodynamics. I lowever, when equipment dimensions exceed the helicopter's
internal cargo capacity, loads are rigged externally. When feasible, supply-dclivery
missions are combined with retrograde operations to derive the maximum benefit from
the airfirame. Typical retrograde nissions include evacuation of repair equipment, en-
emy prisoners of war, human remains, noncombatants and casualties [Rcf. 20: p. 2-201.
c. Coumnand and Controi
The pace of contemporary warfare continues to substantiate Sun Tzu's
maxim that "Rapidity is the essence of war." The speed which characterizes current
military actions places added emphasis upon astute leadership. Wars once measured in
years arc now gauged in days. Each commander attempts to accelerate his decision-
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making process, forcing his opponent to lag behind the battle's momentum, reacting to
the conflict rather than initiating actions of his own.
With the US Army's adoption of Airland Battle Doctrine, command and
control is largely implemented with broad miission-type orders which "specify what must
be done without prescribing how it must be done." [Rel. 16: p. 21] Accordingly, sub-
ordinates we afforded the tactical latitudC to exercise personal initiative in an ever-
changing battlefield. Despite the freedom allorded junior leaders, the commander
cannot completely relegate the conduct of the battle to his subordinates. Changes in the
conander's intent will occur during the course of combat. Decisive points on today's
fluid battleground are fleeting and often require hasty directives to secure favorable
outcomes. Add to the frenetic pace of battle its increased geographic scope, and the
ability of the connandcr to accurately assess the progress of combat and issue appro-
priate guidance is sorely tested. From a stationary ground station the task can become
impossible. As a result, command and control is frequently exercised fiom a utility air-
craft specifically configured with a comnmand radio suite.
Tlhe flight mission is actually a mixture of two competing and contradictory
tasks. Functionally, the aircraft must traverse large geographic areas with sufficient al-
titude to afford the commander a view of the battle and conmmunications contact with
his subordinates. Conversely, the crew must limit their exposure over the battlefield to
minimize risk of destruction or capture. Consequently, the aerial conunand and control
mission is inherently a precarious one.
d. Search and Rescue
Search and rescue entails the location and recovery of downed aviation
crews. Although the Air Force/Air Component Commander is doctrinally charged with
the responsibility fur theater-level search and rescue, each service is required to maintain
resources capable of performing the mission within their inunediate operational area
[Ref. 20: p. 2-191. Search and rescue operations are distinguished by the areas in which
they are pcrformed. Missions confined to areas within friendly lines prompt overt com-
bat rescue operations. Conversely, incursions into hostile territory generally require
covert operations relying upon unique equipment and the capabilities of' Special Forces
personnel.
The selection of equipment and composition of rescue teams is dependent
upon the survivors' condition, equipment available and the threat environment, permfis-
sive or nonpermissive. Crews routinely carry aeromedical personnel and specialized
equipment used to extract personnel from terrain which precludes safely landing the
22
REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE
aircraft. Additionally, unescorted search and rescue missions into enemy areas are
normally performed at night using evasive flight techniques, terrain avoidance radar and
night vision goggles [Rcf. 20: p. 3-131. An aviation unit's most valuable assets arc its
crews; despite the peril patently associated with the mission, the attempted recovery of
a downed aircrew will usually be made.
e. Air Assault
Air Assault operations combine the lift and firepower capabilities inherent
to the helicopter with those of dismounted infantry in a task organized team. Used
principally to engage eneny forces or seize terrain, air assault assets aflbrd the task Force
commander the unique ability to strike at the enemy throughout the breadth of the
battle area largely unencumbered by extended distances and terrain irregularities. Both
the aviation assets and the lifted forces are tactically tailored to the assigned ission.
The infantry force is supplemented with other combined arms assets consistent with the
demands of the assigned mvission. Likewise, attack, observation, utility and cargo heli-
copters are incorporated into a self-supporting aviation team [Rcf. 21: p. 1-lI.
Characterized by deliberate planning and aggressive execution, air assaults
manifest exceptional capabilities. By virtue of its heliborne mobility, the air assault can
respond quickly to the rapid pace of combat operations. The Force can engage an enemy
from virtually any direction, thus achieving a degree of tactical surprise. Augmented by
utility and cargo helicopters, such operations can be sustained independent of' secure
ground lines of communication for linfited periods of time. Further, aviation recon-
naissance assets provide the task force commander with immediate combat intelligence
enabling him to effect necessary tactical adjustments as the operation proceeds. In
short, the integration of helicopter and ground assault forces offers the most striking
contemporary example of combat force synergism tReE: 21: pp. 1-2-1-31.
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V. TIlE AIRCRAFT
"Something like the helicopter comes along only' rarely in his tory, es,eiyfev humied years."
L TG laurr, I K. 0. Kinnard
Warfare today is a 'come as you are' proposition, and it exacts a heavy toll from
combatants. 'he US cannot, as in the past, anticipate lengthy periods of mobilization
to meet its military contingencies. Our current inventory of military equipment must
be sufficient to meet our global contingency commitments; timc to build another will be
unavailable.
The responsibility of properly equipping the Arined Forces is a continuous and often
thankless job. Because of inherent delays associated with converting a concept on paper
into a piece of functional hardware, the problem must be approached in repetitive cycles.
As one system is fielded another passes through concept analysis so that when the cur-
rent systems exhaust their usefulness, timely replacement can occur. Oen needs of the
force must be projected twenty years into the future in order that advanced capabilities
can be incorporated into follow-on weapon systems as they are needed.
This equipment renewal process is essential to the maintenance of combat cfl'ec-
tiveness. As an armed force matures, its equipment naturally ages, periodically flalls into
disrepair and relative to newer additions to an opponent's weapons inventory, becomes
less effective. Further, with age hardware accrues greater expense. Tlhe longer a system
remains in service, the greater is its accumulation of wear, erosion and material fatigue
and the greater is its chance for failure and subsequent repair. Also, procurement of
replacement parts for older systems escalates maintenance costs as arms industries peri-
odically retool to begin manufacture of newer systems and suspend support of older
ones. Consequently, tactical and economic imperatives demand that more efficient
equipment be regularly incorporated into the force.
Relative to Army Aviation, replacement and modification of aircraft is programmed
and executed in accordance with a comprehcnsive procedure called the 'Army Aviation
Modernization Plan.' The plan manages the Army's fleet of aircraft by relfrence to five
distinct mission categories: attack, scout reconnaissance, utility, cargo and special elec-
tronic mission aircraft Ref. 22: p. 371. Airliames in each category are methodically
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overhauled, improved and eventually replaced in order to assure continuous evolution
of the aircraft in consonance with the needs of the force and the advance of technology.
A portion of the plan published in May 1988 pertaining to utility aircraft outlined
a typical expedient used to rcnovate the aging flect. A large number of UII-I Iroquois
helicopters were to be eventually replaced by 2,253 of' the newer UlI-60 Black Ilawk
helicopters. Once the conversion was completed, the U11-60 would assume the majority
of utility missions while the remaining balance of UII-I aircraft would supplement the
fleet performing acrial command and control, acroiedical evacuation and various rear
area transport duties. lelicopters retired rom the fleet would either be discarded or
passed through a cursory maintenance upgrade preparatory to assignment to foreign
military sales. Those remaining would enter a comp.rehensive overhaul program de-
signed to upgrade their performance and capabilities to a level compatible with the
newer UI 1-60. All of these plans were contingent upon sufficient contract Funding being
made available during each of the procurement years. More recent defense budget pro-
posals indicate that such is not the case [Rec. 231.
Adjusting to an evaporating pool of defcense dollars, the Army plans to suspend
procurement of the Black llawk helicopter beyond calendar year 1991. By that time
total UlI-60 procurement will have reached 1,147, considerably short of the 2,253 ori-
ginally requested [Ref. 241. The obvious alternative lies in retaining more UII-I heli-
copters, the quantity of which will depend upon the actual number of UI 1-60s purchased
and the results of Army force structure modilications. flow this compromise translates
into lost capability is best estimated through a technical comparison of the two aircraft.
The U11-II1 Iroquois is a gas turbine driven helicopter currently in general use
within the active, reserve and national guard lorces. Built by Bell ellicopter lextron
Inc. [Ret: 25: p. 3411, the basic airframe has been modified numerous times to various
mission conligurations to include attack, acromedical evacuation, electronic counter-
measures and utility. The current utility aircraft version was first Iiamitlmf/itured in Sep-
tember 1967, and today the active helicopter fleet contains 3,147 UII-I helicopters in
either the II (utility), M (gunship) or V (medevac) configuration [Ref. 26: p. 181.
The helicopter can carry a crew of two and eleven combat equipped soldiers or six
litters with a medical attendant or 2,420 pounds of cargo [Ref. 27: p. 1-901. Its range
with maximum fucl is 318 statute miles [Ref. 25: p. 3421 while its service ceiling is 24,210
feet [ ef. 27: p. 1-911.
Armed with two 7.62 mm machineguns, the aircraft can launch and recover from
either hard surface or unprepared sites and perform its assigned mission during day,
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night, inclement weather or light icing conditions. Its two side sliding cargo doors and
knee-levcl cargo floor permit rapid internal loading and unloading from either side while
its 4,000 pound capacity cargo hook is used principally for transporting bulky external
loads. Utility models can also be adapted with a variable speed hoist to acconmodate
tactical extractions fRet. 27: p. 1-891.
Survivability features engineered into the standard utility design include a threat
warning receiver, armored seats for the pilot and copilot and a crashworthy flel cell
which maintains its structural integrity during crash impact and will sellseal pene-
trations caused by projectiles no larger than 50 caliber. The aircraft's outer skin is
painted with low rellectance paint, and somc models carry an exhaust deflector designed
to dissipate the engine's thermal signature in the induced rotor turbulence [Ref. 28].
Logistically, the UII-I is described as an infinite lifi airframe because all of its
component parts can be replaced thereby rendering them lfatigue insensitive. This char-
acteristic is not common to most aircraft. Normally, certain basic structural members
cannot be replaced, and consequently, the aircraft assumes a linited useful life. Because
the Ull-I is an exception to this rule, its cost of maintenance does not increase with age,
a significant advantage. The helicopter enters a scheduled phase inspection each 150
flight hours and requires 280 manhours of support to restore it to flull duty status
[Ref. 291.
Originally the bulk of the uI -I-I fleet was scheduled to be replaced on a two-for-one
exchange by the newer U1-60. Those retained by the Army would enter a service life
extension program to provide them capabilities comparable to the remainder of the
rotary-winged fleet. Planned material improvements included an update of navigation
and conmmunication equipment, provision of infiarcd suppression, chaff and flare
dispensers and installation of new composite construction rotor blades [Ref. 25: p. 3411.
The UII-60A Black llawk was originally designed as a tactical troop carrier to re-
place the U11-I. In Vietnam, helicopter performance suffered as a result of deficiencies
concerning lift capability, crash survivability, ballistic and infirared missile protection.
Accordingly, remedial measures were incorporated into specifications for the next gcl-
eration utility aircraft. The winning design, built by Sikorsky, was capable of trans-
porting an entire eleven man squad and its complement of equipment jlef. 30: p. 11].
Thc first Black llawk officially entered active service in October 1978 with a forecast
useful life of 30 years, and today the equipment inventory totals 1,036 aircraft
[Rcf. 241. The aircraft is driven by two turboshaft engines and is armed with two 7.62
mm machineguns. Like its predecessor, the Ull-60 can adapt to the aeromedical role
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(carrying six standard litters and an attendant) as well as cargo and passenger transport.
The aircraft enters a major scheduled service each 500 flight hours and typically requires
700 manhours of maintenance support to be restored to a mission ready status
[Ref. 31].
Its survivability is enhanccd by infrared suppression, chaff and flair dispcnscrs,
threat radar warniiig, an electronic jammer and composite rotor blades. Its light alloy
construction is designed to withstand vertical, lateral and longitudinal crashes of 38, 30
and 40 ftiscc, respectively. With external fuel tanks the helicopter's range is extendcd
fiom 373 statute milcs to 1380 miles afForditig it scif-deployment capability [Ref. 25:
pp. 480-1]. Through a combination of selective armor plating, composite construction
and redundant components, the aircraft can sustain penetration by projectiles of up to
23 nun without mission interruption [Ref. 321. In short, its design performance specifi-
cations meet or exceed those of the UII-I.
Salient features of the two aircraft are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. AIRCRAFT CONIPARISON
Attributes UtI- 1 II i-60
Maximum Ralnge 124 tum 133 tim
lPassenger Capacity i I 15
Cargo Capacity (lbs) 2,420 3,360
Tcchnically, the UI1-60 is the superior aircraft. Considering the fact that its design
was specifically formulated to overcome deficiencies fbund in the U!I1-1, this conclusion
is not surprising. The Black I lawk statistics demonstrate a clear advantage over the
older Iroquois in payload, infiared suppression, ballistic tolerance and crash
survivability. Conversely, the Black I lawk is more expensive to procure as well as repair.
In light of a radically evolving security environment and a constrained defebnse budget,
the original question concerning UII-I helicopter retention remains unanswered. For
though the Army might simply decide to discard less of the older airframes to accomn-
modate unsupported mission req~irements, it has yet to determine which aircraft is more
capable with regard to future comnmitments. Can the Army afford to operate the more
technically advanced aircraft from a stringently limited budget? If future Army inter-
vention occurs in LIC, it must anticipate a lengthy involvement without America's
transition to a war footing. And further, is the performance of the Black I lawk heli-
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copter which is primarily designed for mechanized warfare, actually superior to tie
Iroquois in a LIC setting? The Army has oitcn been accused of buying oversophisti-
cated equipment and ultimately getting "less and less bang while U. S. defense contrac-
tors got more and more bucks." [Ref. 33: p. 617]
That these questions can be asked before the helicopter inventory is irrevocably de-
pleted and while the threat evolves is indeed fortuitous. Still, answers to these questions
cannot be deduced by a simple table comparisons; however they can be generated using
contemporary statistical analysis.
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VI. THE MODEL
"She had not understood mathematics until he had explained to her that it was the symbolic
language of'relationshilps. 'And relationships,' he told her, 'contained the essential meaning
of life."
Pearl S. Buck
As stated previously, the intent of this thesis is to determine which of two aircraft
is superior in the LIC environment. Thc comparison will be madc using a semi-Markov
process to model aircraft operation and generate appropriate measures of pcrformance.
The rationale for selecting tile semi-Markov process and a description of its lormulation
offer insight regarding the accuracy of its conclusions.
Use of mathematical models to replicate functional aspects of real systems and re-
cord their performance is a popular tool among analysts. Running a model usually ob-
viates the need to exercise the actual system, substantially reducing the accompanying
expense. In some situations, because of the perishable nature of the subject or the fact
that the item ofinttecest resides ctirely in a conceptual form, modeling provides the only
plausible analytical medium. Military combat falls within this latter category, and as a
consequence, military planners rely heavily upon models to predict behavior of weapon
systems and assess their capabilities.
Combat models in the past have taken one of two distinct lorms: high resolution
models attempting to depict individual combatants and aggregated models which repre-
sent forces as groups. Both require generous amounts of technical support for initial
formulation as well as the tactical trials that follow. Alterations of the initial scenario
are, likewise, labor intensive which tends to discourage use of either model type for
wholesale sensitivity analysis. As a result of the extensive effort required to build and
modify such models, contemporary military modeling projects frequently employ small
inexpensive models which can le built quickly, easily manipulated and ultimately dis-
carded. By concentrating upon specific combatants or aspects of combat, such models
escape the minutiae attached to peripheral elements.
Though small, adaptive models hold obvious appeal, their use, nonetheless, must
be tempeled with caution. The model, to include its assumptions, must accurately
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coniplemcent the subject and objectives of the study. Levels of abstraction, requirements
for sensitivity analysis and use of underlying probability distributions must be considered
in their selection, or otherwise, results may be misleading and erroneous.
With specific reference to the analysis of this thesis, the model must forecast without
bias, the performance of two, technically dissinilar aircraft. Americans traditionally
admire technological sophistication, in many instances believing it to be their prime ad-
vantage militarily as well as economically over opponents. In a nation predisposed to
'high tech' solutions, technical impartiality will not be easy to achieve. Also, the model
must consider the aircraft in the low intensity conflict (LIC) regime.
LIC is not peculiar to a particular geographic location; rather it is a style of warfare
which includes a variety of operational environs. In other words, LIC is equally appli-
cable in the triple canopy jungles of Southeast Asia, the mountains of Afghanistan or
the deserts of Iran. Each environment is characterized by unique weather, temperatures,
altitudes and terrain all of which the model must evaluate to perform a valid comparisonl.
Aircraft unsuitability to a particular regime must be discovered before it can jeopardize
an assigned mission. 'lhe commander of* the hostage rescue attempt, Desert One,
aborted his operation because the attached helicopters developed mechanical problems
caused by desert sand and dust, an embarrassing oversight For a nation which pridcs it-
self on technological advantage.
Further, the proliferation of infrared detection devices and sinilarly eqlipl)cd
weapon systems among modern insurgent forces underscores the Army's need to per-
f'orm missions without regard for the time of day. Consequently, potential helicopter
limitations associated with day and night operations must be identified and incorporated
into the comparison. In sum, the model must distinguish between two main variables:
time of day and environment, and register sufficient inbrination to accurately and
impartially evaluate aircraft effectiveness.
The selection of variablcS of interest leads logically to choice of an appropriate an-
alytic model. At first glance, high resolution simulation provides a legitimate approach.
It replicates the operational environment, records results efficiently and incorporates
chance outcomes into the battle's play through stochastic algorithms I lowever, as
noted previously, the excessive labor involved with such projects favors employing more
economic alternatives such as the senii-Miarkov process.
Possibly tile strongest argument supporting use of a semi-Markov process is speed.
The model quickly generates solutions to a stochastic problem in terms of expected val-
ues. Though formulation of the model can absorb considerable effort, especially when
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the desired level of' detail is nminute, once tile iodcl's matrices have been assembled,
performance measures can be calculated in seconds.
Consistent with the model's speed is its transparency, l m1put paramcters can be
modidied separately or in combinations with relative case, and the elffcts of modiica-
tions arc manifest immediately. Thus, sensitivity analysis is easily accomplished using
this technique. Another benefit regards level o" detail. The refincmnent of the model is
controlled entirely by the analyst. Should the analyst need more specilic information,
he,'she can amend a portion of the model while leaving the remainder unaltered or can
incrcase the detail of the entire formulation. And finally, the technique is extremely
versatile in that an initial analysis can serve as a paradigm for similar hardware com-
parisons. For example, variations ol'this model could have been used to select a cockpit
configuration from competing designs for the V-22, tilt-rotor aircraft, or to choose be-
twc n contractor prototypes preparatory to a contract award decision For the LI IX.
Despite the inherent advantages of the scmi-Mlarkov process, its selection to assess
helicopter performance is ultimately contingent upon satisfying the model's basic as-
sumptions described in the following definition:
"A scnii-Markov process is one that chalnges states in accordance with a Markov
chain but takes a random amount of time between changes. More specilically con-
sider a stochastic process with states 0. 1, ..., which is such that, whenever it enters
state i, i > 0:
(i) The next state it will enter is state j with probability Pj, i,j 0.
(ii) Given that the next state to be c itered is state j, the time until the transition
From i to j occurs has distribution lY
If we let Z(t) deniote the state at time t, then [Z(t), t > 0] is called a scmi-Mtarkov
process." [Ref 34: p. 130]
At the heart of the sciii-Ma'-ov process is a discrete time Markov chain. A
Markov chain is a stochastic process which consists of a finite number of values or states
and passes from state to state subject to fixed probabilities. The chain is characteii/cd
by the Markovian property which states that the transition probabilities F'rom the pres-
ent state are independent of the p~ast lRef. 34: p. 1001. By convention, the fixed transi-
tion probabilities are usually represented in matrix notation where individual elements,
P,,, denote the probabiity of passing from state i to state j. The flblowing example
shows such a matrix dcined by three states, {I, 2, 3].
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PII PI2  1)13
P = l21 1'22 123
31 132 1)33
Likewise, a helicopter flight can be described by various linite sequences of mutually
exclusive states. A typical aircraft mission is composed of several scgments, some of'
which occur always and others, occasionally. Each of these mission segments can be
described as a unique state which the aircraft enters, occupies for a period of time and
possibly exits. Linking segments in appropriate sequences 'builds' an aircraft mission.
To illustrate, all missions bcgin with a takeolf maneuver. Once the takeoff is com-
pleted, the pilot transitions into forward flight cn route to his predetermined destination.
From forward flight he might land and pick up passengers, develop mechanical diflicul-
ties which force him to cancel the mission, or be shot down by enemy forces. Each of
these possibilities describes a state which the pilot could enter from forward Ilight. As-
sociated with each of these conditions is a fixed probability estimating the chance that
the aircraft will advance from forward flight to that subsequent state. In this way,
probabilities are used to represent spontaneous (i.e. hostile ecmy lirc) as well as re-
hcarsed (i.e. evasive maneuver) events. Because the number of conceivable mission
segmentits is finite, they can be consolidated into a discrete time Markov chain.
The other major component of the scnii-Markov process regards the time a state
remains occupied, typically called sojourn time. Associated with each transition is a
particular time distribution which for helicopter flights can be represented by constant
time durations drawn from actual flight experience. Continuing the example, the
amount of time that pilots spend flying prior to loading passengers, being shot down or
developing mechanical difficulties can be estimated and tabulated into a transition time
matrix which, when paired with the discrete time Markov chain, defines a sciii-Markov
process.
With the model's conceptional justification accomplished, the state space used in
this analysis was formulated based upon the flight nissions previously enumerated.
Each of the live standard utility, helicopter issions was divided into mutually exclusive
segments which were combined to form rows and colunuis of a transition matrix. An
identical matrix was built for each of three environments (jungle, mountain and desert),
two lighting conditions (day and night), and two helicopter types (UII-f and UII-60).
With the assistance of experienced pilots fiom Fort Ord and Fort Rucker, transition
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probabilities and sojourn times were entered into the twelve matrices. Through algebraic
manipulation each transition probability/time matrix pair generated measures of per-
fibrmance peculiar to a specific environment, lighting condition and aircraft.
The flight segments composing the state space were intentionally selected to repre-
sent variables of interest to the analysis. Though all portions of a hypothetical mission
profile miust appear in some form within the state space array, those events upon which
measures of eflfctiveness (MOE) depend were depicted by unique states.
For example, the forecast number of 'successful launches', 'accidents' and 'cargo
deliveries' were essential components of the primary MO" and were consequently re-
flected by separate states. Conversely, 'evasive maneuvers', 'hovering' and 'returning
lire' were actions noncritical to this analysis and were, as a result, absorbed within more
comprehensive states such as 'perforning terrain flight navigation' or 'preparing an ex-
ternal load operation'.
A complete listing and explanation of the states chosen to characterize utility heli-
copter flight nissions are provided in Appendix B. The computer program written in
A Progranuning Language (APL) and used to algebraically manipulate the matrix pairs
and generate MOE is listed in Appendix C while a simple example illustrating the com-
putational methodology is included in Appendix D.
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VII. THE ANALYSIS
"New conditions require Jo solution, and new weapons require for miaxinmun application,
new and imaginative methods."
General Douglas Alac,4 rhur
Ilow does one best approach a comparison of two dissimilar aircraft bound to a
conunon mission? What factors are relevant to contemporary military leaders and can
best assist them in making inlormed decisions regarding our fluture force structure? Of
fundamental importance is operational elffctivcness. Doctrinally, this concept hinges
upon two factors: nmission performance and survivability [Ref. 35: p. 2-21. Accordingly,
thcse same two elements were used to guide selection of various measures of effective-
ness (MOE) with which to compare the two aircraft. Further, with the future expecta-
tion of smaller deleiise budgets, contemporary military planners must better appreciate
the costs associated with active inventory hardware. Therefbre, a cost analysis supple-
menting the performance measures was included to specifically address the expense issue.
1-lopefully, these lictors presented in concert should sulliciently quantify functional and
fiscal differences between the two aircraft to accomplish a valid comparison.
The approach used in this analysis generally follows a. deductive argument leading
to basic conclusions relative to each aircraft. Initially, limiting assumptions were made
to pare the comparison to a manageable size. Concurrent with formulation of the
model's state space, MOE were selected to characterize the cost and performance fac-
tors. Next, three hypothetical situations were constructed, two reflecting bias toward
one or the other aircraft and a third representing a compromise between the two ex-
tremes. Finally, using MOE generated froln the three situations, dilercices in per-
formance and costs associated with the two helicopters were compared and analyzed.
A more thorough review of this process substantiates not only the validity of the con-
clusions but also the utility of the model.
In addition to specific mathematical assumptions previously enumerated regarding
selection of the senfi-Markov process, other basic assumptions were used to facilitate the
analysis. In order to avoid the myriad questions regarding tactics and aircraft mixes,
single aircraft were compared. Consequently, the synergistic eilects possible by organ-
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izing aircraft in various combinations were considered equivalent for both aircraft types
and effectively ignored.
Relative to formulation of the model's transition matrices, input probabilities and
sojourn times were ultimately based upon the opinions of one individual, the author,
using his experience, technical research and discussion with other military aviators. Al-
though different pilots night disagree with the values chosen, hopefully, they would
agree with the general trend of values proposed between aircraft and between scenarios.
To illustrate, the transition probability matrices portray the U 11-60 generating a smaller
signature than its predecessor while enjoying superior ballistic tolerance to enemy lire.
Furthermore, though human error and mechanical malfunction contribute to aircraft
accidents, in hostile environments the risk associated with aircraft destruction is prima-
rily associated with enemy fire. Because a helicopter's flight profile is more exposed in
desert areas, less in jungles and fairly obscured in mountainous regions, threat effec-
tiveness against both aircraft is characterized greatest in the desert and progressively less
in jungles and mountains. Likewise, risk of engagement is reflected greater during day-
light conditions than at night. Therefore, because the analysis will involve comparative
trends between the helicopters as much as specific values, disagreements concerning
specific index values should not invalidate the conclusions.
To adequately characterize aircraft operation, eight separate MOE were used in
various combinations. Functionally, the eight performance measures separate into one
of two categories, mission accomplishment and aircraft performance. Because both air-
craft are primarily used as means of transport, the average daily delivery capabilities in
terms of cargo weight (MOE 1) and personnel (MOE 2) were used to assess mission
accomplishment while the remaining six measures emphasize qualities associated with
aircraft performance. MOE 3, the expected aircraft lifetime, gives a broad initial esti-
mate of aircraft survivability. Narrowing that estimate to the time an aircraft spends in
an operationally ready status, MOE 4 predicts the expected aircraft useful lifetime while
MOE 5, the dillrence between MOE 3 and 4, represents the time absorbed in mainte-
nance and repair. MOE 6, the average hourly flight mission length, gauges the model's
inherent realism. Agreement between predicted mission lengths and aircraft flight en-
durance tinies provides a degree.of model verification, lending credibility to time model's
forecasts. MOE 7, the number of successful aircraft launches, ollers yet another indi-
cation of aircraft longevity while the last performance measure, MOE 8, represents the
percent of an aircraft's expected lifetime spent flying missions. Table 3 summarizes the
calculations associated with each MOE.
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Table 3. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE CALCULATIONS
MOE 1 M07Max Acft Cgo Load!M)F3
MOI : 2 M)li7*Max Acft Pass Load/MOiE3
MOE 3 Algebraic Manipulation of I fIput Matrices
MOE 4 Algebraic Manipulation of Input Matrices
IOI 5 MOI3-NM1 4
MI" O6 Algebraic Manipulation of I iput Matrices
NIOE 7 Algebraic Manipulation oflput Matrices
MOI 8 M 016 * M O F7,I M Ol 3
T[hosc entries which indicate calculation by means of algebraic manipulation involve
operations upon the input transition matrices. Because their calculation is quite com-
plicated, the interested reader should consult the algorithm listed in Appendix C.
The first of threc hypothetical situations, serving as the base case, contained prob-
abilities representing actual aircraft capabilities. Consistent with the previously de-
scribed trends, the UI1-60 enjoyed greater tolerance to enemy fire as indicated by
probabilities associated with aircraft damage assessment. Conversely, a damaged U 1-60
was more inclined to require extensive repair eflort than the UII-1. Tables 4 and 5
sununiarize the salient probabilistic difkrences between the two aircraft relative to the
initial situation.
Table 4. PROBABILITY OF LANDING UN DAMAG ED/DAMNAGED
Acft Day Night
Desert jungle Mount Desert Jungle Mount
UII-l .80,'.20 .85,'.15 .87/.13 .85,".15 .88,'.12 .92/.08
UlI 1-60 .87,1.13 .89,.I1 .92/.08 .90,1. 10 .92,1.(8 .95/.05
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Measures associated with mission perlormance relative to tile first set of conditions
demonstrate some surprising results which are tabulated in Table 6.
Table 6. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE #1 AN!) 12
MOE Act Day Nightj)esert .1unglc Mount Desert Jungle Mount
Max Cargo 1ll-I 1279.0 1369.6 1395.7 1345.1 1409.0 1494.4
Delivered "
l)ailv UII-60 1261.1 1304.1 1388.6 1309.3 1365.1 1452.1
Max Passern- Ill-I 5.8 6.2 6.3 6.1 6.4 6.8gers Deliv-
ered Daily U 11-60 5.6 5.8 6.2 5.8 6.1 6.5
Assuming each aircraft is dedicated to cargo or passenger transport, each of tile
listed scenarios postulates that the UH-I will deliver greater quantities of men or
equipment daily than its planned replacement, the UII-60. Admittedly, the surplus is
only marginal, varying from 0.5% in the Day Mountain setting to 5%/0 in Day Jungle
conditions; but even the presumption that the two are comparable is startling. The ra-
tionale for this apparent disparity stems firom the inordinate amount of time needed to
repair and maintain the more technically sophisticated UI 1-60. Though the aircraft en-
ters a major preventive maintenance service once each 500 hours, the amount of labor
involved in the service approaches 700 manhours. Conversely, the UlI-I enters service
more frequently, at 150 hour intervals, but requires only 280 manhours to return to op-
erational status [Ref. 311. Similarly, the amount of labor associated with combat dam-
age repair is greater for the UIl-60.
Discounting performance differences between aircraft, the trends apparent through-
out the range of scenarios are consistent with the fundamental assumptions regarding
risk. As danger associated with the enemy increases from mountain to jungle to desert
settings and from night to day conditions, one would expect deliveries of cargo and men
to decline, and indeed they do.
Considered collectively, MOE 3 through 5 provide a broad estimate of aircraft
survivability. Forecast values are presented in Table 7.
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Table 7. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE #3, #4 AND 1/5
MOE AcDay 
Night
lDesert Jungle Mount )esert Jungle Mount
Total Acft UI1-I 154.3 233.5 480.1 204.7 352.2 473.4
Life (days) UI11-60 637,9 1475.5 1989.8 953.0 1399.3 1924.7
Acft Useful UI[-I 93.8 152.1 32.6 134.2 240.7 344.8
Lif'e (days) j 11-60 j 272.1 649.5 925.5 429.3 652.3 954.4
Acft IUII -1 60.5 81.4 157.5 70.5 111.5 128.7
Main, Repair
Time (days) UIt-60 365.8 826.0 1064.2 523.7 747.0 970.3
The data confirm that in all environments the UII-60 is a more survivable aircraft.
Useful liletime figures (MOE 4) indicate that the Ull-60 will outlive the UIt-I by from
170% in the Night Jungle scenario to 327% in the Day Jungle setting or averaged over
all scenarios, 201%. I lowever, this added longevity is not gratuitous. The associatcd
cost is identified in the excessive time spent in maintenance and repair (MOE 5). The
time spent in nonoperational status by the U 11-60 is from six to ten times that or the
UII-l, and of its expected total lifetime, 50% to 57% can be anticipated in an other-
than-useful condition. Not only does this relatively high percentage of maintenance
detract from the aircraft's flight mission, but it suggests that use of the UI 1-60 must be
accompanied by a larger, more extensive support organization.
The last three MOE provide supplemental information used to verify consistency
between previous performance measures as well as empirical performance data. Values
are indicated in Table 8.
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Table 8. MEASUJRES OF PERFORMANCE 1/6, 1/7 AND 118
Day NightM!OE Acft -I______DCsert Jungle Mount Desert Jungle Mount
Avg Nisn UlII-i 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.(o
Length(hours) II-60 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.2
Numbcr or" LII-1 81.6 132.1 276.9 113.8 205.1 292.4Missionu
Launches U i 1-0( 239.4 572.7 822.3 371.4 568.5 83 1.8
I ight As a 1 iI - I .040 .040 .043 .051 .048 .052
Lie LI 1-6)0 .024 .020) .)19 .024 .021 .022
_ 
_Life_ 
_ _ _ 
_
The average duration of a flight mission provides the primary linkage betwcen the
model's predictions and historical data. Notice that relative to the UIi-I, data values
do not exceed its maximum flight endurance of 2.5 hours P Ref. 28]. Similarly, the
UlI-60's maximum Forecast mission duration of 1.5 hours is well below its flight endur-
ance of 2.3 hours [lRef. 32]. Also, the consistently shorter times logged by the U1 1-60
are indicative of its faster cruise speed, 120 knots as compared to 90 knots for the U I 1-1.
The count of successful mission launches (MOE 7) oflers another measure or lon-
gevity and provides a check of consistency against the useful lifetime of the aircraft.
Broadly spcaking, the measure represents the number of successful missions one can
anticipate throughout the aircraft's life. Theoretically, diflrences separating aircraft
relative to mission launlches should closely parallel corresponding dill'erences in the
number of useful days available (MOE 4). A quick calculation confirms that the re-
spective differences vary by no more than 4%. The number of days by which launches
lag useful days results From a 24 hour interval with which the model interspaces all
missions.
The final performance measure, flightime as a percentage of aircraft lifetime (MOE
8), provides another perspective of aircra't perlormance. That the numbers are small
must be expected; the combination of necessary repairs, maintenance, crew availability
and general idleness would tend to absorb considerable time driving the measures down.
The revealing aspect of these values is the degrec by which the less sophisticated Il 1-1
exceeds the UII-60, on the average 110%. As noted previously, the difference is attrib-
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utable to maintenance and repair demands of the U11-60. But the regularity and mag-
nitude of advantage enjoyed by the UII-I suggests a direct correlation between higher
technology and reduced availability.
'hc second and third situational variations were created to investigate efkcts re-
suiting as a consequence of adjusting transition probabilities to flivor one aircraft or the
other. This portion of the analysis demonstrates the model's transparency and hence its
ability to perform sensitivity analysis. T[hough each of these 'extreme' situations rellects
bias toward a specific helicopter, the assigned probabilities were not unrealistic as a de-
scription of the first variation confirms.
In order to create controlled bias favoring the U11-I, probabilities associated with
that aircraft were held constant while data elements associated with the UI 1-60 were al-
tered. First, the U11-60's tolerance to enemy fire was reduced 1% to 2%, though not
below that of the U11-1. Second, the U1I1-60's requirement fbr extensive repair effort as
a result of battle damage was increased 6%. The probability adjustments are suniua-
rized in Tables 9 and 10.
Table 9. PROBABILITY OF LANDING UNDAMIAGED/DAMAGED (BIAS
UH-l)
Aclt )ay Night
Desert .ungle Mount )esCrt J ungle Mount
1II-I .80,'.20 .85,.15 .87/.13 .05. 15 .881.12 .92/.08
Ull-60 .85,,.15 .87/.13 .90,.10 .88,.12 .9I/.09 .94/.06
Table 10. PROBABILITY DAMAGE IS MODERATE/SEVERE (BIAS UII-1)
Acft All Scenarios
UI 1-1 .901,.1 J
1. 11-60 .80,,.20
Though similar changes are manifest proportionally throughout many of the indices,
the effect is clearly seen by reference to daily cargo deliveries (MOE 1) alone as shown
in Table ii.
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Table 11. MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE #I
MOE Acl Day Night
l)esCrt Jungle Mount l)esert Jungle Mount
Max Cargo U I1-I 1279.0 1369.6 1395.7 1345.1 1409.0 1494.4DeliveredDail U-60 1159.7 1203.1 1288.3 1210.4 1295.2 1389.1
As cursory examination indicates, pounds of cargo delivcred daily by the UII-60
have dccreascd relative to each scenario. Where before the UII-I enjoyed a very mar-
ginal advantage, now the gap separating the two aircraft has widened to between 7.5%
to 13.8%, a substantial rise. Earlier findings would suggest that though the reduction
of ballistic protection would account for a modest share of the growth, the majority re-
sulted from the UI 1-60's severe time penalty associated with extensive repair operations.
Table 12. PROBABILITY OF LANDING UNDAMAGED/DANlAGED (BIAS
1_ 1-60)
_____ Day Night
Desert .Jungle Mount I)csert Jungle Mot
U)" -I .80,;.20 .85/15 .87/.13 85.15 .88,.12 .92,1.08
U 11-60 1 .90,.10 .92/.08 .95/.05 .9 1 '.09 .94/.06 .97,'.03
Table 13. PROBABILIIY DAMAGE IS MODERATE/SEVERE (BIAS UII-60)
Aclit All l-rnvirons
UII-I .9Y !(
U I 1-60 .90". i0
As Tables 12 and 13 indicate, the second situational variation with bias favoring the
UI 1-60, was prepared with probabilistic adjustments analogous to the previous trial save
in the opposite direction. Probabilities associated with the UII-60's ballistic resistance
increased 2% to 3% while those relating to damage repair were equated with the UlI-I's.
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Table 14. MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE fIt
Day Night
Desert Jungle NI ount Desert Jungle Nount
lax Cargo (uI-I 1279.0 1369.6 1395.7 1345.1 1409.0 1494.4
Delivered
DIail UII-60 1366.3 1410.5 1497.2 1365.0 1444.6 1529.2
The amount of daily cargo delivered by the UI i-60, reflected in Table 14, now shows a
significant increase over measures recorded for the preceding two trials. In this instance
a reversal has occurred as the UII-60 now enjoys complete dominance over the UIl-I
relative to this performance measure ranging f'om 1.5% in the Night Desert setting to
over 7%"o in the Day Mountain environment.
I laving exarnincd cight separate measures of effectivencss and two excursions in-
volved with damage accrual and repair, the comparison lacks an analysis of cost. Air-
cral't expenditures can be broadly grouped into three categories: procurement, repair and
maintenance. Because this study concerns use and disposition of existing hardware as-
sets, procurement costs are irreleva-t and, accordingly, are ignored. The US Army
Sal ~ty Center located at Fort Rucker, Alabama, collects and records data pertaining to
accidents involving Army aircraft by fiscal year. Within their computer archives are
stored detailed information regarding each accident to include costs associated with
material loss and repair. Also located at Fort Rucker, the US Army Aviation Center
administers flight training and qualification for the Army's pilots and, consequently,
maintains a fleet of lixed and rotary-winged aircraft. In addition to accident information
requested fiom the Safety Center, estimates of labor costs associated with periodic
maintenance of the UlI I-1 and UlI 1-60 were requested friom a representative of the local
contracting office. Table 15 tabulates relevant cost figures in dollars.
Table 15. COST PARAMETERS
_ _ _ _ _II-I U 11-60
Organizational ?Nlaititenance 0 122
Intermcdiate N! ,tintena nce 4,20) 24,500
Avg Accident Cost 1,800.33 5,603.17
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Rather than simply comparing operating costs among aircraft, pounds of delivered
cargo were selected as a conunon reference with which to relate costs to performance.
Accordingly, a cost ratio taking the form of' the delivery cost of a pound of cargo, was
used to evaluate the two helicopters, both assumed dedicated exclusively to the cargo
mission. The resulting cost ratios based upon the initial probability data set (base case)
are presented in Table 16.
Table 16. COSr EFFECTIVENESS RATIOS
Aci l)ay NightDesert Jungle N Mount e)sert Jungle Mount
S per Pound Il-I .25 .20 .18 .20 .17 .14
Delivered uIl 1-60 .50 .4-1 .35 .42 .36 .27
The cost ratios which are notably independent of time, generally parallel results as-
sociated with the daily cargo delivery rate (MOE 1). In all cases the U11-1 proves the
more economic alternative by a considerable margin (204% averaged across all scenar-
ios). The trends reflected in the cost ratios also parallel those of the daily cargo delivery
rate as both aircraft encounter cost increases as the mission passes from mountains
through jungles to deserts and likewise from night to daylight operations. In sum, while
the daily cargo delivery rate revealed a relati~zly expensive penalty in terms of repair and
maintenance time associated with the UI -60, the cost ratios reflect a similar penalty in
terms of dollars; analytical evidence that time is indeed moncy.
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VIII. A SUMIARY OF FINDINGS
"New opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other reason but be-
cause they are not already common."
Locke
It would be inappropriate for an analyst to declare absolutely one aircraft superior
to another regardless of' his results. The scini-Markov process used to model aircraft
performance was largely based upon the opinions of a single pilot. Also, the perform-
ance measures and cost ratios selected to facilitate the comparison, admittedly, could
not evaluate all aspects of aircraft operation. And yet as a preliminary analysis, certain
findings should be of considerable value to planners contemplating the composition of
the Army's future utility helicopter fleet.
Operational ellectiveness categorized in ternis of its two doctrinal components,
mission performance and aircraft survivability, provided the initial focus of the analysis.
Regarding daily mission performance, the UI I-I marginally surpassed the Ul1-60's ca-
pability to deliver cargo and personnel to destination in all operational etvironments
considered. This result is directly attributable to the lengthy periods of time required
by the Ul 1-60 for maintenance and repair. Conversely, the UII-60 has greater longevity
by a substantial margin in all operational settings.
Regarding aircraft operation costs, expenses associated with the UlI 1-60 generally
exceed thosc of the UII-I by 200%. This cost analysis should assume greater relevance
when considcred in light of potentially long term low intcnsity conflicts coincident with
diminished delinse budgets.
Also, the greater logistical dependence forecast for the UII-60 will likely require a
larger, more extensive maintenance organization and may require greater numbers in
units to insure the availability of continuous support.
As a prelininary report, this analysis has revealed some surprising relationshlii- be-
tween two dissimilar utility helicopters. The analysis has also demonstrated the case and
power associated with the scnii-Markov process as a forecasting modeling tool. What
remains is a rigorous verification of the model's input parameters and, subject to the
questions oF'Army leadership, appropriate modification and/or expansion of the model.
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In this Way the comparative strengths and weaknesses of' the subject aircraft will be
made apparent and fLutLure decisions regarding procuremenlt and rceneltioii Wvill be malde
wisely.
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APPENDIX A. P'ROBABILITY AND TIME TRANSITION MATRICES
Table 17. IUI-I TRANSuIION PROB3ABILITY MIATRIX (DAY DESERT)
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Table 18. U1-I TRANSITION TIME MATRIX (DAY DESERI)
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Table 19. UFH-l -TRANSITION PROBABILIT'YNMA'TRIX (DAYItJN(GLE)
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Table 20. ILJI1-- TRANSITION TIMIE NIAIRIX (DAY .JNGLE)
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Table 21. Ut-I TRANSIIiON PROBABILITY MATRIX (DAY MOUNTAIN)
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Table 22. UtiI TRANSITION TIME MIATRIX (DAY MOUJNTAIN)
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Table 25. II-I TRANSITION PROBABILITY MATRIX (NIGHT JUNGLE)
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Table 26. IJH-I TRANSITION TIME MIATRIX (NIGhIT JUNGLE)_- - --
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Table 29. UH-60 TRANSITION PROBABILITY MATRIX (DAY DESERT)
fm 73' co-- 0 . = -1'




tac T, O0- Z-
loiter
land en route
lo a d g o c a s,.r, ,
sling ex. load ,
ra p r e ~li' , o p n l
paradrop ,





land OK -_ ;-) *
- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -e
land. dam.ed
drop ext load '; .
land ext load ,,
land LI'( l











REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE
Table 30. 1Itl-60 TRANSITION TIME MATRIX (DAY DESERT)
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Tlable 31. 131l-6() TRANSITION PROBABILITY MAT-RIX (DAY JUNGLE)
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Table 32. UH-60 TRANSITION TIME MATRIX (DAY JUNGLE)
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Table 33. (t4-60 TRANSITION PROBABiLITY MATRIX (DAY MOUNTAIN)
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Table 34. 14-l-60) TRANSITION TIME MATRIX (DAY MOUNTAIN)
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Table 35. UI-60 TRANSITION PROBABILITY MATRIX (NIGHT DESERT)
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Table 36. IJII-60iTRANSITION TIMIE NIAlI RIX (NiGInr DESERT)
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Table 37. UI--60 TRANSITION PROBABILITY MATRIX (NIGHT JUNGLE)
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Table 38. IH-61) TR ANS ITION TIME MAI-RIX (NI(;11T .JIJNGLE)
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Table 39. UiI-60 TRANSITION PROBABILITY MATRIX (NIGHt" MOUNTAIN)
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Table 40. UII1-60 TRANSITION TIM'E MATRIX (NIGHT MOUNTAIN)
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APPENDIX B. STATE SPACE DESCRIPTION
initial T/O the initial helicopter takeoll signaling tile start of a flight mission
tac T/O a tactical takeoff performed in a hostile environment using cover and
concealment to mask movement
tac nay tactical flight during which a helicopter employs one of three flight profiles:
Nap-ofthe-Earth (reduced speed and as close to the ground as ambient
lighting conditions permit), Contour (conforning to terrain contours at
moderate speeds) and Low Level (flying rapidly at a low, constant altitude
which avoids all obstacles), while navigating through the intended flight
path [Ref. 36: pp. 6-2-6-31
search a mission requiring aerial reconnaissance or location of a geographic refer-
ence or force
ID LZ identifying a planned landing or drop zone
loiter hovering or flying about a vicinity awaiting some action such as aerial ar-
tillery preparation of an enemy occupied landing zone
land en route a landing, forced or voluntary, prior to miission termination
load ego/cas internally loading cargo and,/or casualties within the helicopter
sling ext load all preparation for an external load operation preceding the actual takeoff
rappeling opn a delivery operation during which trained personnel descend fiom ropes
anchored from a hovering helicopter [Rcf. 36: p. 11-1]
paradrop delivery of equipment and/or personnel from a helicopter by parachute
unload evacuation of cargo, passengers and casualties from the internal helicopter
compartment
refuel-rearm replenishing the helicopter's basic load of M60 machinegun amununition
and fuel, often while tile aircraft engine remains at idle
lost self explanatory
VHIRP vertical helicopter instrument flight rules recovery procedure: a procedure
initiated when a helicopter [lying with visual reference to the horizon, inad-
vertently encounters obscuration (clouds, dust, snow, sand) and must trail-
sition to instrument flight
500 AGL flight at or above 500 feet above ground level
detected detected by enemy forces
land OK after executing a successFul end-of-mission landing, the post Ilight in-
spection detects no combat related damage
engaged engaged by enemy forces
land damaged altcr executing a successful end-of-miission landing, post flight inspection
reveals combat related damage
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drop ext load enmergency jettison of external load
land ext load successful tcrmination of an external load operation
land EOMI successful mission terin~iationi at launch facility
depot a condition in which extensive repair or maintenance is accomplished
shop a condition in which intermediate repair or maintenance is accomplished
aivait insn a conimdtion during which a helicopter sustains daily inspections and awaits
the subsequent mission launchI
destroyed aircraft is economically unrcpairablc
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APPENDIX C. APL COMPUTATIONAL PROGRAMI
V WARP ARRAY
El] W*+/ARRAY~i.12;; ]xARRAY[12+t12;;]
[2] 1-( 27 27 pl,27p0
£3] Q-( 12 26 26 pO
[4] QC1;;]+f-M(1l 1 *(I-ARRAY[1;;]))
£6] Q£3;;>4-M(1 -1 +(I-ARRAY£;;]))
£7] Q[3;;]+W-(1 -1 +(I-ARRAY;;]))
£8] Q[5;;]+M(1 -1 +(I-ARRAY£5;;J))
£81 Q£7;;]+M(1 -1 +(I-ARRAY£;;]))
12] Q[6;;] M(1 -1 +(I-ARRAYC6;;J))
£13] Q£1;;]+MI-l -1i +(I-ARRAY£O;;]))
£15] Q[12;;]*-M(1 -1 +(I-ARRAYC12;;]))
£16] Ni- 12 1 26 +~Q
£17] N-- 12 26 pN






£24] PNNi- 12 24 +NN








£33] AlOE 5i-MOE3 -MOE'4











































£75] 0Ox(+/MOE7£6+i6] )*(+/MOE7£t6] )
£76] 10oxMQE'8[16l+M0E8£6+il
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APPENDIX D. MIETHODOLOGY FOR MATRIX MANIPULATION
The following example illustrates the sequential methodology used to generate the model's
MOE.
Create the transition probability matrix, 1), and the sojourn time matrix, I.
Table 41. EXAMIPLE P MIATRIX
-~ '<
Start .98 .01 .01
fly .2 ()2 .28 .48 .02
unload .98 .02
car-go





Table 42. EXAMPLE TNIAIMI
Start . 1.
IN .9 .5 .9 .9 .5
unload2
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The matrix axes must include conspicuous start and end segments in order to deter-
mine the number of miissions completed prior to loss. The aircraft loss segment (crash),
represented by an absorbing state, is likewise essential; otherwise, the aircraft would fly
Forever. The sojourn tirme matrix records the expectcd useful mission time associated
with each transition. Zero is entered for any transition from an absorbing state.
Calculate w,, the expected useful mission time for each segment.
t= Pj til' V i
= [.l0.88 .20.o.A0 0.00.0 ]
Partition P into four sub-matrices:
* Q :transient -* transient transitions
R : transient -* absorbing transitions
I : absorbing - absorbing transitions




0.0 .98 0.0 .01 0.0 0.0 .01
0.0 0.0 .20 .02 .28 .48 .02
0.0..98 0.0 .02 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 .70 .02 0.0 .04 .19 .05
0.0 .98 0.0 .02 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
If P does not have all transient segments in the upper-left corner and absorbing seg-
ments in the lower right, exchange rows and coluims in P to make it so prior to parti-
tioning the matrix.
* Calculate the Markov chain's fundamental matrix, (l-Q)-l [Ref. 37: p. 7601.
Where N = (I-Q)-1
19 37 7 1 10 18
18 38 S I 11 18
18 38 9 1 11 18
IN= 1 36 7 21 10 8 (yith nirounded to integer values)
18 38 8 1 12 18
19 37 7 1 10 19
N contains n,,, the expected number of' times that state j is visited, starting from state i.
Thus. by relerencing the start segment, 1, one can determine the expected niumber
of visits to each segment before absorption (crash).
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Table 43. FIRST LINE FROM N MATRIX.
1 19 137 1 7 1 11 10 118
" Using starting segment i = 1, nY~ and w,, calculate the expected (total jscful mission) life-
time.
L = z ny j = 36.98 (MOE #3)
jctransiont segments
" As a chieck of the model, using n,, compute the average mission length.
L _ 36.98
n 1 - 0.5 19 -0.5
Approximating the last mission as hialf the length of an average mnission, the two
hour mission length calculated is well within the aircrafts' capabilities.
" Calculate the remaining MOE.
" Amount of' cargo delivered prior to aircraft destruction (MOE #1) (7) x (Cargo
carrying capacity of aircraft)
" Number of'soldiers moved prior to aircraft destruction (MOE #2) =(10) x (Troop
carrying capacity of aircraft)
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APPENDIX E. DATA RESULTS WITH UHI-I BIAS
Table 44. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS #1 THROUGH H8
MO1 Acft Day Night
Desert Jungle Mount Desert Junglc Mount
Max Cargo UII-I 1279.0 1369.6 1395.7 1345.1 1409.0 1494.4
Delivercd Daily L 11-60 1159.7 1203.1 1288.3 1210.4 1295.2 1389.1
Max Passen- 1II-I 5.8 6.2 6.3 6.1 6.4 6.8
gers Dclivcred
l)ailv U 11-60 5.2 5.4 5.8 5.4 5.8 6.2
Total Acft Life UII- 154.3 233.5 480.1 204.7 352.2 473.4
(days) U 11-60 693.7 1599.4 2144.7 1030.9 1474.9 2011.9
,Ucft Useful Life UlI-I 93.8 152.1 322.6 134.2 240.7 344.8
(days) U 11-60 272.1 649.5 925.5 429.3 652.3 954.4
Acft U1I-I 60.5 81.4 157.5 70.5 111.5 128.7
Nain,' Repair
Time (days) U11-60 421.6 949.9 1219.1 601.6 822.6 1057.6
Avg Msn UII-I 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.0
Length (hours) LI 1-60 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.2
Number of UH-I 81.6 132.1 276.9 113.8 205.1 292.4
Mission
Launches 1-11-60 239.4 572.7 822.3 371.4 568.5 831.8
Flight As a ULI 1- 1 .040 .040 .043 .051 .048 .052
Percent Acft
Life U11-60 .022 .019 .018 .022 .020 .021
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APPENDIX F. DATA RESULTS WITH Ul-60 BIAS
Table 45. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS I1 TIIROUGH #8
Day NightMOE Acft Desert Jungle Mount Desert Jungle Mount
Max Cargo U11-1 1279.0 1369.6 1395.7 1345.1 1409.0 1494.4
Delivered Daily UII1-(0 1366.3 1410.5 1497.2 1365.0 1444.6 1529.2
Max Passen- UII-l 5.8 6.2 6.3 6.1 6.4 6.8gers l)elivered6. 68lDaily UI 1-60 6.2 6.3 6.7 6.1 6.4 6.8
Total Acft Life II-I 154.3 233.5 480.1 204.7 352.2 473.4(days) JI -t() 5888 1364.3 1845.5 914.1 1322.4 1827.6
AXcft Useful Life 1Ii-I 93.8 152.1 322.6 134.2 240.7 344.8
(days) UI1-60 272.1 649.5 925.5 429.3 652.3 954.4
Acft t11-1 60.5 81.4 157.5 70.5 111.5 128.7M ain,' RepairTime (days) UI 1-60 316.7 714.8 920.0 484.8 670.1 873.3
Avg Msn UII- 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.0
Length (hours) UI i-60 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.2
Number of UII-I 81.6 132.1 276.9 113.8 205.1 292.4MissionLaunches UI 1-60 239.4 572.7 822.3 371.4 568.5 831.8
Flight As a UI1-I .040 .040 .043 .051 .048 .052
Percent Acli
lifi2 UI 1-60 .025 .022 .020 .025 .022 .024
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